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The basic modeling
primitives we use are based on the Recursive Modeling Method
(RMM) (see [8] in this Volume) [6] [2]
[3]. RMM provides a theoretical framework for
representing and using the knowledge that an agent has about its
expected payoffs and those of others. To use RMM, an agent is expected
to have a payoff matrix where each entry represents the payoffs the
agent expects to get given the combination of actions chosen by all
the agents. Typically, each dimension of the matrix corresponds to one
agent, and the entries along it to all the actions that agent can
take. The agent can (but need not) recursively model others as
similarly having payoff matrices, and them modeling others the same
way, and so on.... The recursive modeling only ends when the agent
has no deeper knowledge. At this point, a Zero Knowledge (ZK) strategy
can attributed to the particular agent in question, which basically
says that, since there is no way of knowing whether any of its actions
are more likely than others, all of the actions are equally
probable. If an agent does have reason to believe some actions are
more likely than others, this different probability distribution can
be used. RMM provides a method for propagating strategies from the
leaf nodes to the root. The strategy derived at the root node is what
the agent performing the reasoning should do.
Figure 1: This is an example RMM hierarchy for two agents A1 and A2. The
leaves of the tree will either be Zero Knowledge (ZK) strategy or a
sub-intentional model. Note that we consider the ZK strategy and the
NO-INFO model in [8], as equivalent.
An example payoff matrix along with its RMM hierarchy, is shown in
Figure 1. This RMM hierarchy represents a situation from
agent A1's point of view and, therefore, has her payoff matrix at the
root. Assuming that agent A1 knows something about how A2 represents
the situation, then A1 will model A2 in order to predict his
strategies, which will allow A1 to generate better strategies for
herself. These models take the form of payoff matrices and are placed
below the root node. The probability associated with each branch
captures the uncertainty A1 has about A2. If A1 similarly knows
something about what A2 might know about how A1 represents the
situation, this could be further captured as more deeply nested payoff
matrices, as implied in the left branch of the figure. If A1 knows
something about what A2 expects A1 to do in the situation but not how
A2 represents A1's thinking, then A1 could associate with A2 a
sub-intentional model of A1 that summarizes A1's likely
actions. Finally, If A1 believes that A2 has no knowledge of A1, this
can be captures in a ZK strategy, as shown by the rightmost branch.
Next: Limited Rationality
Up: Introduction
Previous: Introduction
Jose M. Vidal
jmvidal@umich.edu
Sun Mar 10 12:52:06 EST 1996