Vidal's libraryTitle: | RMM's Solution Concept and the Equilibrium Point Solution |
Author: | José M. Vidal and Edmund H. Durfee |
Book Tittle: | Proceedings of the 13th International Distributed Artificial Intelligence Workshop |
Year: | 1994 |
Abstract: | Research in distributed AI has dealt with the interactions of agents' both cooperative and self-interested. The Recursive Modeling Method (RMM) is one method used for modeling rational self-interested agents. It assumes that knowledge is nested to a finite depth. An expansion of RMM using a sigmoid function was proposed with the hope that the solution concept of the new RMM would approximate the Nash EP in cases where RMMS knowledge approximated the common knowledge that is assumed by game theory. In this paper, we present a mathematical analysis of RMM with the sigmoid function and prove that it indeed tries to converge to the Nash EP. However, we also show how and why it fails to do so for most cases. Using this analysis we argue for abandoning the sigmoid function as an implicit representation of uncertainty about the depth of knowledge in favor of an explicit representation of the uncertainty. We also suggest other avenues of research that might give us other more efficient solution concepts which would also take into consideration the cost of computation and the expected gains. |
Cited by 2 - Google Scholar
@INPROCEEDINGS{vidal:94a,
AUTHOR = {Jos\'{e} M. Vidal and Edmund H. Durfee},
TITLE = {{RMM}'s Solution Concept and the Equilibrium Point
Solution},
BOOKTITLE = {Proceedings of the 13th International Distributed
Artificial Intelligence Workshop},
YEAR = 1994,
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/papers/vidal94a.pdf},
postscript = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/papers/vidal94a.ps},
citeseer = {vidal94rmms.html},
googleid = {0akXaXXONPgJ:scholar.google.com/},
keywords = {multiagent modeling},
abstract = {Research in distributed AI has dealt with the
interactions of agents' both cooperative and
self-interested. The Recursive Modeling Method (RMM)
is one method used for modeling rational
self-interested agents. It assumes that knowledge is
nested to a finite depth. An expansion of RMM using
a sigmoid function was proposed with the hope that
the solution concept of the new RMM would
approximate the Nash EP in cases where RMMS
knowledge approximated the common knowledge that is
assumed by game theory. In this paper, we present a
mathematical analysis of RMM with the sigmoid
function and prove that it indeed tries to converge
to the Nash EP. However, we also show how and why it
fails to do so for most cases. Using this analysis
we argue for abandoning the sigmoid function as an
implicit representation of uncertainty about the
depth of knowledge in favor of an explicit
representation of the uncertainty. We also suggest
other avenues of research that might give us other
more efficient solution concepts which would also take
into consideration the cost of computation and the
expected gains.},
cluster = {17885147023864736209}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:13:49 EST 2011