Vidal's library
Title: An Incentive-Compatible Distributed Recommendation Model
Author: José M. Vidal
Book Tittle: Proceedings of the Sixth International Workshop on Trust, Privacy, Deception, and Fraud in Agent Societies
Pages: 84--91
Year: 2003
Abstract: Our research is concerned with the study and development of incentive-compatible exchange mechanisms for recommendations in a multiagent system. These mechanism will allow and motivate agents to create an economy of ideas, where agents trade recommendations between themselves. In this paper we present a domain model and an incentive-compatible protocol for information exchange. Our model captures a subset of the realities of recommendation exchanges in the Internet. We provide an algorithm that selfish agents can use for deciding whether to exchange recommendations and with whom. We analyze this algorithm and show that, under certain common circumstances, the agents' rational choice is to exchange recommendations. Finally, we have implemented our model and algorithm and tested the performance of various populations. Our results show that both the social welfare and the individual utility of the agents is increased by participating in the exchange of recommendations.

Cited by 3  -  Google Scholar

@InProceedings{vidal03b,
  author = 	 {Jos\'{e} M. Vidal},
  title = 	 {An Incentive-Compatible Distributed Recommendation Model},
  booktitle = 	 {Proceedings of the Sixth International Workshop on Trust, Privacy, Deception, and Fraud in Agent Societies},
  year =	 2003,
  abstract = 	 {Our research is concerned with the study and
                  development of incentive-compatible exchange
                  mechanisms for recommendations in a multiagent
                  system. These mechanism will allow and motivate
                  agents to create an economy of ideas, where agents
                  trade recommendations between themselves. In this
                  paper we present a domain model and an
                  incentive-compatible protocol for information
                  exchange. Our model captures a subset of the
                  realities of recommendation exchanges in the
                  Internet. We provide an algorithm that selfish
                  agents can use for deciding whether to exchange
                  recommendations and with whom.  We analyze this
                  algorithm and show that, under certain common
                  circumstances, the agents' rational choice is to
                  exchange recommendations. Finally, we have
                  implemented our model and algorithm and tested the
                  performance of various populations. Our  results
                  show that both the social welfare and the individual
                  utility of the agents is increased by participating
                  in the exchange of recommendations.},
  pages = 	 {84--91},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/papers/vidal03b.pdf},
  keywords = 	 {multiagent recommender trust},
  googleid = 	 {_ALhmjBEHfwJ:scholar.google.com/},
  cluster = 	 {18166751447430005500}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:15:41 EST 2011