Vidal's libraryTitle: | An Incentive-Compatible Distributed Recommendation Model |
Author: | José M. Vidal |
Book Tittle: | Proceedings of the Sixth International Workshop on Trust, Privacy, Deception, and Fraud in Agent Societies |
Pages: | 84--91 |
Year: | 2003 |
Abstract: | Our research is concerned with the study and development of incentive-compatible exchange mechanisms for recommendations in a multiagent system. These mechanism will allow and motivate agents to create an economy of ideas, where agents trade recommendations between themselves. In this paper we present a domain model and an incentive-compatible protocol for information exchange. Our model captures a subset of the realities of recommendation exchanges in the Internet. We provide an algorithm that selfish agents can use for deciding whether to exchange recommendations and with whom. We analyze this algorithm and show that, under certain common circumstances, the agents' rational choice is to exchange recommendations. Finally, we have implemented our model and algorithm and tested the performance of various populations. Our results show that both the social welfare and the individual utility of the agents is increased by participating in the exchange of recommendations. |
Cited by 3 - Google Scholar
@InProceedings{vidal03b,
author = {Jos\'{e} M. Vidal},
title = {An Incentive-Compatible Distributed Recommendation Model},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Sixth International Workshop on Trust, Privacy, Deception, and Fraud in Agent Societies},
year = 2003,
abstract = {Our research is concerned with the study and
development of incentive-compatible exchange
mechanisms for recommendations in a multiagent
system. These mechanism will allow and motivate
agents to create an economy of ideas, where agents
trade recommendations between themselves. In this
paper we present a domain model and an
incentive-compatible protocol for information
exchange. Our model captures a subset of the
realities of recommendation exchanges in the
Internet. We provide an algorithm that selfish
agents can use for deciding whether to exchange
recommendations and with whom. We analyze this
algorithm and show that, under certain common
circumstances, the agents' rational choice is to
exchange recommendations. Finally, we have
implemented our model and algorithm and tested the
performance of various populations. Our results
show that both the social welfare and the individual
utility of the agents is increased by participating
in the exchange of recommendations.},
pages = {84--91},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/papers/vidal03b.pdf},
keywords = {multiagent recommender trust},
googleid = {_ALhmjBEHfwJ:scholar.google.com/},
cluster = {18166751447430005500}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:15:41 EST 2011