Vidal's library
Title: Sequential Decision Making in Parallel Two-Sided Economic Search
Author: David Sarne and Teijo Arponen
Book Tittle: Proceedings of the Sixth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Year: 2007
Crossref: aamas07
Abstract: This paper presents a two-sided economic search model in which agents are searching for beneficial pairwise partnerships. In each search stage, each of the agents is randomly matched with several other agents in parallel, and makes a decision whether to accept a potential partnership with one of them. The distinguishing feature of the proposed model is that the agents are not restricted to maintaining a synchronized (instantaneous) decision protocol and can sequentially accept and reject partnerships within the same search stage. We analyze the dynamics which drive the agents' strategies towards a stable equilibrium in the new model and show that the proposed search strategy weakly dominates the one currently in use for the two-sided parallel economic search model. By identifying several unique characteristics of the equilibrium we manage to efficiently bound the strategy space that needs to be explored by the agents and propose an efficient means for extracting the distributed equilibrium strategies in common environments.



@InProceedings{sarne07a,
  author =	 {David Sarne and Teijo Arponen},
  title =	 {Sequential Decision Making in Parallel Two-Sided
                  Economic Search},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the Sixth International Joint
                  Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
                  Systems},
  crossref =	 {aamas07},
  year =	 2007,
  abstract =	 {This paper presents a two-sided economic search
                  model in which agents are searching for beneficial
                  pairwise partnerships. In each search stage, each of
                  the agents is randomly matched with several other
                  agents in parallel, and makes a decision whether to
                  accept a potential partnership with one of them. The
                  distinguishing feature of the proposed model is that
                  the agents are not restricted to maintaining a
                  synchronized (instantaneous) decision protocol and
                  can sequentially accept and reject partnerships
                  within the same search stage. We analyze the
                  dynamics which drive the agents' strategies towards
                  a stable equilibrium in the new model and show that
                  the proposed search strategy weakly dominates the
                  one currently in use for the two-sided parallel
                  economic search model. By identifying several unique
                  characteristics of the equilibrium we manage to
                  efficiently bound the strategy space that needs to
                  be explored by the agents and propose an efficient
                  means for extracting the distributed equilibrium
                  strategies in common environments.},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/sarne07a.pdf},
  keywords = 	 {negotiation economics}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:47 EST 2011