Vidal's libraryTitle: | Sequential Decision Making in Parallel Two-Sided Economic Search |
Author: | David Sarne and Teijo Arponen |
Book Tittle: | Proceedings of the Sixth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems |
Year: | 2007 |
Crossref: | aamas07 |
Abstract: | This paper presents a two-sided economic search model in which agents are searching for beneficial pairwise partnerships. In each search stage, each of the agents is randomly matched with several other agents in parallel, and makes a decision whether to accept a potential partnership with one of them. The distinguishing feature of the proposed model is that the agents are not restricted to maintaining a synchronized (instantaneous) decision protocol and can sequentially accept and reject partnerships within the same search stage. We analyze the dynamics which drive the agents' strategies towards a stable equilibrium in the new model and show that the proposed search strategy weakly dominates the one currently in use for the two-sided parallel economic search model. By identifying several unique characteristics of the equilibrium we manage to efficiently bound the strategy space that needs to be explored by the agents and propose an efficient means for extracting the distributed equilibrium strategies in common environments. |
@InProceedings{sarne07a,
author = {David Sarne and Teijo Arponen},
title = {Sequential Decision Making in Parallel Two-Sided
Economic Search},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Sixth International Joint
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems},
crossref = {aamas07},
year = 2007,
abstract = {This paper presents a two-sided economic search
model in which agents are searching for beneficial
pairwise partnerships. In each search stage, each of
the agents is randomly matched with several other
agents in parallel, and makes a decision whether to
accept a potential partnership with one of them. The
distinguishing feature of the proposed model is that
the agents are not restricted to maintaining a
synchronized (instantaneous) decision protocol and
can sequentially accept and reject partnerships
within the same search stage. We analyze the
dynamics which drive the agents' strategies towards
a stable equilibrium in the new model and show that
the proposed search strategy weakly dominates the
one currently in use for the two-sided parallel
economic search model. By identifying several unique
characteristics of the equilibrium we manage to
efficiently bound the strategy space that needs to
be explored by the agents and propose an efficient
means for extracting the distributed equilibrium
strategies in common environments.},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/sarne07a.pdf},
keywords = {negotiation economics}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:47 EST 2011