Vidal's libraryTitle: | Solving the Auction-Based Task Allocation Problem in an Open Environment |
Author: | David Sarne and Sarit Kraus |
Book Tittle: | Proceedings of Twentieth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence |
Pages: | 164--169 |
Year: | 2005 |
Crossref: | aaai05 |
Abstract: | In this paper we analyze the process of allocating tasks to self-interested agents in uncertain changing open environments. The allocator in our model is responsible for the performance of dynamically arriving tasks using a second price reverse auction as the allocation protocol. Since the agents are self-interested (i.e. each agent attempts to maximize its own revenue), previous models concerning cooperative agents aiming for a joint goal are not applicable. Thus the main challenge is to identify a set of equilibrium strategies - a stable solution where no agent can benefit from changing its strategy given the other agents' strategies - for any specific environmental settings. We formulate the model and discuss the difficulty in extracting the agents' equilibrium strategies directly from the model's equations. Consequently we propose an efficient algorithm to accurately approximate the agents' equilibrium strategies. A comparative illustration through simulation of the system performance in a closed and open environments is given, emphasizing the advantage of the allocator operating in the latter environment, reaching results close to those obtained by a central enforceable allocation. |
Cited by 3 - Google Scholar
@InProceedings{sarne05a,
author = {David Sarne and Sarit Kraus},
title = {Solving the Auction-Based Task Allocation Problem in
an Open Environment},
booktitle = {Proceedings of Twentieth National Conference on
Artificial Intelligence},
crossref = {aaai05},
pages = {164--169},
year = 2005,
abstract = {In this paper we analyze the process of allocating
tasks to self-interested agents in uncertain
changing open environments. The allocator in our
model is responsible for the performance of
dynamically arriving tasks using a second price
reverse auction as the allocation protocol. Since
the agents are self-interested (i.e. each agent
attempts to maximize its own revenue), previous
models concerning cooperative agents aiming for a
joint goal are not applicable. Thus the main
challenge is to identify a set of equilibrium
strategies - a stable solution where no agent can
benefit from changing its strategy given the other
agents' strategies - for any specific environmental
settings. We formulate the model and discuss the
difficulty in extracting the agents' equilibrium
strategies directly from the model's
equations. Consequently we propose an efficient
algorithm to accurately approximate the agents'
equilibrium strategies. A comparative illustration
through simulation of the system performance in a
closed and open environments is given, emphasizing
the advantage of the allocator operating in the
latter environment, reaching results close to those
obtained by a central enforceable allocation.},
keywords = {multiagent auctions task-allocation},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/sarne05a.pdf},
cluster = {2581919643919100741}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:28 EST 2011