Vidal's library
Title: Coalitions among computationally bounded agents
Author: Tuomas W. Sandholm and Victor R. T Lesser
Journal: Artificial Intelligence
Volume: 94
Number: 1--2
Pages: 99--137
Year: 1997
DOI: 10.1016/S0004-3702(97)00030-1
Abstract: This paper analyzes coalitions among self-interested agents that need to solve combinatorial optimization problems to operate efficiently in the world. By colluding (coordinating their actions by solving a joint optimization problem) the agents can sometimes save costs compared to operating individually. A model of bounded rationality is adopted where computation resources are costly. It is not worthwhile solving the problems optimally: solution quality is decision-theoretically traded off against computation cost. A normative, application- and protocol-independent theory of coalitions among bounded-rational agents is devised. The optimal coalition structure and its stability are significantly affected by the agents' algorithms' performance profiles and the cost of computation. This relationship is first analyzed theoretically. Then a domain classification including rational and bounded-rational agents is introduced. Experimental results are presented in vehicle routing with real data from five dispatch centers. This problem is NP-complete and the instances are so large that---with current technology---any agent's rationality is bounded by computational complexity.

Cited by 181  -  Google Scholar

@Article{sandholm97b,
  author =	 {Tuomas W. Sandholm and Victor R. T Lesser},
  title =	 {Coalitions among computationally bounded agents},
  journal =	 {Artificial Intelligence},
  year =	 1997,
  volume =	 94,
  number =	 {1--2},
  pages =	 {99--137},
  abstract =	 {This paper analyzes coalitions among self-interested
                  agents that need to solve combinatorial optimization
                  problems to operate efficiently in the world. By
                  colluding (coordinating their actions by solving a
                  joint optimization problem) the agents can sometimes
                  save costs compared to operating individually. A
                  model of bounded rationality is adopted where
                  computation resources are costly. It is not
                  worthwhile solving the problems optimally: solution
                  quality is decision-theoretically traded off against
                  computation cost. A normative, application- and
                  protocol-independent theory of coalitions among
                  bounded-rational agents is devised. The optimal
                  coalition structure and its stability are
                  significantly affected by the agents' algorithms'
                  performance profiles and the cost of
                  computation. This relationship is first analyzed
                  theoretically. Then a domain classification
                  including rational and bounded-rational agents is
                  introduced. Experimental results are presented in
                  vehicle routing with real data from five dispatch
                  centers. This problem is NP-complete and the
                  instances are so large that---with current
                  technology---any agent's rationality is bounded by
                  computational complexity.},
  keywords =     {multiagent bounded-rationality coalitions},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/sandholm97b.pdf},
  doi = 	 {10.1016/S0004-3702(97)00030-1},
  googleid = 	 {TwCvebxQQ5cJ:scholar.google.com/},
  cluster = 	 {10899644293592318031}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:14:19 EST 2011