Vidal's libraryTitle: | eMediator: A Next Generation Electronic Commerce Server |
Author: | Tuomas Sandholm |
Book Tittle: | Proceedings of the First International Conference on Autonomous Agents |
Year: | 2000 |
Abstract: | This paper presents eMediator, a next generation electronic commerce server that demonstrates some ways in which algorithmic support and game theoretic incentive engineering can jointly improve the efficiency of ecommerce. First, its configurable auction house includes a variety of generalized combinatorial auctions, price setting mechanism, nobel bid types, mobile agents, and user support for choosing anauction type. Second, its leveled commitment contract optimizer determines the optimal contrat price and decommitting penalties for a variety of leveled commitment contracting protocols, taking into account that rational agents will decommit insincerely in Nash equilibrium. Third, its safe exchange planner enables unenforce anonymous exchanges by dividing the exchange into chunks and sequencing those chunks to be delivered safely in alternation between the byer and the seller.Each of the three components is based on different types of game theoretic equilibrium analysis, and also required development of new algorithms and GUI designs to make it feasible. |
Cited by 153 - Google Scholar
@InProceedings{sandholm00a,
author = {Tuomas Sandholm},
title = {eMediator: A Next Generation Electronic Commerce
Server},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the First International Conference on
Autonomous Agents},
year = 2000,
abstract = {This paper presents eMediator, a next generation
electronic commerce server that demonstrates some
ways in which algorithmic support and game theoretic
incentive engineering can jointly improve the
efficiency of ecommerce. First, its configurable
auction house includes a variety of generalized
combinatorial auctions, price setting mechanism,
nobel bid types, mobile agents, and user support for
choosing anauction type. Second, its leveled
commitment contract optimizer determines the optimal
contrat price and decommitting penalties for a
variety of leveled commitment contracting protocols,
taking into account that rational agents will
decommit insincerely in Nash equilibrium. Third, its
safe exchange planner enables unenforce anonymous
exchanges by dividing the exchange into chunks and
sequencing those chunks to be delivered safely in
alternation between the byer and the seller.Each of
the three components is based on different types of
game theoretic equilibrium analysis, and also
required development of new algorithms and GUI
designs to make it feasible.},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/sandholm00a.pdf},
cluster = {17217927742185056931},
keywords = {multiagent combinatorial auctions}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:14:59 EST 2011