Vidal's library
Title: eMediator: A Next Generation Electronic Commerce Server
Author: Tuomas Sandholm
Book Tittle: Proceedings of the First International Conference on Autonomous Agents
Year: 2000
Abstract: This paper presents eMediator, a next generation electronic commerce server that demonstrates some ways in which algorithmic support and game theoretic incentive engineering can jointly improve the efficiency of ecommerce. First, its configurable auction house includes a variety of generalized combinatorial auctions, price setting mechanism, nobel bid types, mobile agents, and user support for choosing anauction type. Second, its leveled commitment contract optimizer determines the optimal contrat price and decommitting penalties for a variety of leveled commitment contracting protocols, taking into account that rational agents will decommit insincerely in Nash equilibrium. Third, its safe exchange planner enables unenforce anonymous exchanges by dividing the exchange into chunks and sequencing those chunks to be delivered safely in alternation between the byer and the seller.Each of the three components is based on different types of game theoretic equilibrium analysis, and also required development of new algorithms and GUI designs to make it feasible.

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@InProceedings{sandholm00a,
  author =	 {Tuomas Sandholm},
  title =	 {eMediator: A Next Generation Electronic Commerce
                  Server},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the First International Conference on
                  Autonomous Agents},
  year =	 2000,
  abstract =	 {This paper presents eMediator, a next generation
                  electronic commerce server that demonstrates some
                  ways in which algorithmic support and game theoretic
                  incentive engineering can jointly improve the
                  efficiency of ecommerce. First, its configurable
                  auction house includes a variety of generalized
                  combinatorial auctions, price setting mechanism,
                  nobel bid types, mobile agents, and user support for
                  choosing anauction type. Second, its leveled
                  commitment contract optimizer determines the optimal
                  contrat price and decommitting penalties for a
                  variety of leveled commitment contracting protocols,
                  taking into account that rational agents will
                  decommit insincerely in Nash equilibrium. Third, its
                  safe exchange planner enables unenforce anonymous
                  exchanges by dividing the exchange into chunks and
                  sequencing those chunks to be delivered safely in
                  alternation between the byer and the seller.Each of
                  the three components is based on different types of
                  game theoretic equilibrium analysis, and also
                  required development of new algorithms and GUI
                  designs to make it feasible.},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/sandholm00a.pdf},
  cluster = 	 {17217927742185056931},
  keywords = 	 {multiagent combinatorial auctions}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:14:59 EST 2011