Vidal's libraryTitle: | Stable Team Formation Among Self-Interested Agents |
Author: | Priyang Rathod and Marie des Jardins |
Book Tittle: | AAAI Workshop on Forming and Maintaing Coalitions in Adaptive Multiagent Systems |
Year: | 2004 |
Abstract: | Autonomous agents in a multi-agent system must sometimes collaborate with other agents in order to perform complex tasks, regardless of whether they are inherently self-interested or cooperative. However, the nature of such a collaboration may vary in duration, from a single-task short-term coalition to a stable contractual alliance. The real world is replete with instances of both types of organizations. We present a multi-agent environment with self-interested agents whose aim is to perform tasks by forming simple teams with other agents. Team leaders recruit agents to join teams by proposing contracts that allocate various payoff shares to the team members. Contracts can be longterm (indefinite-length commitment with a buy-out penalty for leaving the team) or dynamic (commits the joining agent to the team only for a single task). We compare several alternative strategies for forming stable teams empirically and show that in the proposed environment, stable teams have greater organizational efficiency than dynamic teams. We also identify specific conditions and strategies for which stable teams have an advantage over dynamic ones. |
Cited by 0 - Google Scholar
@InProceedings{rathod04a,
author = {Priyang Rathod and Marie des Jardins},
title = {Stable Team Formation Among Self-Interested Agents},
booktitle = {{AAAI} Workshop on Forming and Maintaing Coalitions
in Adaptive Multiagent Systems},
year = 2004,
abstract = {Autonomous agents in a multi-agent system must
sometimes collaborate with other agents in order to
perform complex tasks, regardless of whether they
are inherently self-interested or
cooperative. However, the nature of such a
collaboration may vary in duration, from a
single-task short-term coalition to a stable
contractual alliance. The real world is replete with
instances of both types of organizations. We present
a multi-agent environment with self-interested
agents whose aim is to perform tasks by forming
simple teams with other agents. Team leaders recruit
agents to join teams by proposing contracts that
allocate various payoff shares to the team
members. Contracts can be longterm
(indefinite-length commitment with a buy-out penalty
for leaving the team) or dynamic (commits the
joining agent to the team only for a single
task). We compare several alternative strategies for
forming stable teams empirically and show that in
the proposed environment, stable teams have greater
organizational efficiency than dynamic teams. We
also identify specific conditions and strategies for
which stable teams have an advantage over dynamic
ones.},
keywords = {multiagent coalitions},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/rathod04a.pdf},
cluster = {6617936971922011154}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:16 EST 2011