@Article{klein03a,
  author =	 {Mark Klein and Peyman Faratin and Hiroki Sayama and
                  Yaneer Bar-Yam},
  title =	 {Negotiating Complex Contracts},
  journal =	 {Group Decision and Negotiation},
  year =	 2003,
  volume =	 12,
  pages =	 {111--125},
  month =	 {March},
  url =		 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/klein03a.pdf},
  doi =		 {10.1023/A:1023068821218},
  googleid = 	 {heQkVSnSKX8J:scholar.google.com/},
  abstract =	 {Work to date on computational models of negotiation
                  has focused almost exclusively on defining contracts
                  consisting of one or a few independent issues and
                  tractable contract spaces. Many real-world
                  contracts, by contrast, are much more complex,
                  consisting of multiple inter-dependent issues and
                  intractably large contract spaces. This paper
                  describes a simulated annealing based approach
                  appropriate for negotiating such complex contracts
                  that achieves near-optimal social welfares for
                  negotiations with binary issue dependencies.},
  keywords =     {multiagent negotiation},
  cluster = 	 {9163085991825958021}
}