Vidal's libraryTitle: | An Equal Excess Negotiation Algorithm for Coalition Formation |
Author: | Hrishikesh J. Goradia and José M. Vidal |
Book Tittle: | Proceedings of the Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems Conference |
Year: | 2007 |
Abstract: | Coalition formation is an important form of interaction in multiagent systems. It enables the agents to satisfy tasks that they would otherwise be unable to perform, or would perform with a lower efficiency. The focus of our work is on real-world application domains where we have systems inhabited by rational, self-interested agents. We also assume an environment without any trusted central manager to resolve issues concerning multiple agents. For such environments, we have to determine both an optimal (utility-maximizing) coalition configuration and a stable payoff configuration, concurrently and in a distributed fashion. Solving each of these problems is known to be computationally expensive, and having to consider them together exacerbates the problem further. In this paper, we present our Progressive, Anytime, Convergent, and Time-efficient (PACT) algorithm for coalition formation to address the above concerns. We assess the stability of the resulting coalition by using a new stability concept, the relaxed core, which is a slight variation on the core. We show experimentally that our algorithm performs admirably in comparison to an optimal solution, it typically produces solutions that are relaxed-core-stable, and it scales well. |
Cited by 2 - Google Scholar
@InProceedings{goradia07b,
author = {Hrishikesh J. Goradia and Jos\'{e} M. Vidal},
title = {An Equal Excess Negotiation Algorithm for Coalition
Formation},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent
Systems Conference},
year = 2007,
abstract = {Coalition formation is an important form of
interaction in multiagent systems. It enables the
agents to satisfy tasks that they would otherwise be
unable to perform, or would perform with a lower
efficiency. The focus of our work is on real-world
application domains where we have systems inhabited
by rational, self-interested agents. We also assume
an environment without any trusted central manager
to resolve issues concerning multiple agents. For
such environments, we have to determine both an
optimal (utility-maximizing) coalition configuration
and a stable payoff configuration, concurrently and
in a distributed fashion. Solving each of these
problems is known to be computationally expensive,
and having to consider them together exacerbates the
problem further. In this paper, we present our
Progressive, Anytime, Convergent, and Time-efficient
(PACT) algorithm for coalition formation to address
the above concerns. We assess the stability of the
resulting coalition by using a new stability
concept, the relaxed core, which is a slight
variation on the core. We show experimentally that
our algorithm performs admirably in comparison to an
optimal solution, it typically produces solutions
that are relaxed-core-stable, and it scales well.},
comment = {40\% acceptance rate.},
cluster = {10299263292880061076},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/papers/goradia07b.pdf}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:46 EST 2011