@InProceedings{estivie06a,
  author =	 {Sylvia Estivie and Yann Chevaleyre and Ulle Endriss
                  and and Nicolas Maudet},
  title =	 {How Equitable is Rational Negotiation?},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the Fifth International Joint
                  Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
                  Systems},
  year =	 2006,
  crossref =	 {aamas06},
  abstract =	 {Notions of fairness have recently received increased
                  attention in the context of resource allocation
                  problems, pushed by diverse applications where not
                  only pure utilitarian efficiency is sought. In this
                  paper, we study a framework where allocations of
                  goods result from distributed negotiation conducted
                  by autonomous agents implementing very simple
                  deals. Assuming that these agents are strictly
                  self-interested, we investigate how equitable the
                  outcomes of such negotiation processes are. We first
                  discuss a number of methodological issues raised by
                  this study, pertaining in particular to the design
                  of suitable payment functions as a means of
                  distributing the social surplus generated by a deal
                  amongst the participating agents. By running
                  different experiments, we finally identify
                  conditions favouring equitable outcomes.},
  keywords =     {multiagent negotiation},
  url =		 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/estivie06a.pdf},
  cluster = 	 {8159832722218232126}
}