@Article{dash07a,
  author =	 {Rajdeep K. Dash and Perukrishnen Vytelingum and Alex
                  Rogers and Esther David and Nicholas R. Jennings},
  title =	 {Market-Based Task Allocation Mechanisms for Limited
                  Capacity Suppliers},
  journal =	 {{IEEE} Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics
                  - Part A.},
  year =	 2007,
  abstract =	 {This paper reports on the design and comparison of
                  two economically-inspired mechanisms for task
                  allocation in environments where sellers have nite
                  production capacities and a cost structure composed
                  of a xed overhead cost and a constant marginal
                  cost. Such mechanisms are required when a system
                  consists of multiple self-interested stakeholders
                  that each possess private information that is
                  relevant to solving a system-wide problem. Against
                  this background, we rst develop a computationally
                  tractable centralised mechanism that nds the set of
                  producers that have the lowest total cost in
                  providing a certain demand (i.e. it is efcient). We
                  achieve this by extending the standard Vickrey-
                  Clarke-Groves mechanism to allow for multi-attribute
                  bids and by introducing a novel penalty scheme such
                  that producers are incentivised to truthfully report
                  their capacities and their costs. Furthermore our
                  extended mechanism is able to handle sellers'
                  uncertainty about their production capacity and
                  ensures that individual agents nd it protable to
                  participate in the mechanism. However, since this
                  rst mechanism is centralised, we also develop a
                  complementary decentralised mechanism based around
                  the continuous double auction. Again because of the
                  characteristics of our domain, we need to extend the
                  standard form of this protocol by introducing a
                  novel clearing rule based around an order book. With
                  this modied protocol, we empirically demonstrate
                  (with simple trading strategies) that the mechanism
                  achieves high efciency. In particular, despite this
                  simplicity, the traders can still derive a prot from
                  the market which makes our mechanism attractive
                  since these results are a likely lower bound on
                  their expected returns.},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/dash07a.pdf}
}