Vidal's library
Title: Trust-Based Mechanism Design
Author: Rajdeep Dash, Sarvapali Ramchurn, and Nicholas Jennings
Book Tittle: Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems
Pages: 748--755
Publisher: ACM
Year: 2004
Abstract: We define trust-based mechanism design as an augmentation of traditional mechanism design in which agents take into account the degree of trust that they have in their counterparts when determining their allocations. To this end, we develop an efficient, individually rational, and incentive compatible mechanism based on trust. This mechanism is embedded in a task allocation scenario in which the trust in an agent is derived from the reported performance success of that agent by all the other agents in the system. We also empirically study the evolution of our mechanism when iterated and show that, in the long run, it always chooses the most successful and cheapest agents to fulfill an allocation and chooses better allocations than other comparable models when faced with biased reporting.

Cited by 28  -  Google Scholar

@InProceedings{dash04a,
  author =	 {Rajdeep Dash and Sarvapali Ramchurn and Nicholas
                  Jennings},
  title =	 {Trust-Based Mechanism Design},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the Third International Joint
                  Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent
                  Systems},
  pages =	 {748--755},
  year =	 2004,
  publisher =	 {{ACM}},
  abstract =	 {We define trust-based mechanism design as an
                  augmentation of traditional mechanism design in
                  which agents take into account the degree of trust
                  that they have in their counterparts when
                  determining their allocations. To this end, we
                  develop an efficient, individually rational, and
                  incentive compatible mechanism based on trust. This
                  mechanism is embedded in a task allocation scenario
                  in which the trust in an agent is derived from the
                  reported performance success of that agent by all
                  the other agents in the system. We also empirically
                  study the evolution of our mechanism when iterated
                  and show that, in the long run, it always chooses
                  the most successful and cheapest agents to fulfill
                  an allocation and chooses better allocations than
                  other comparable models when faced with biased
                  reporting.},
  keywords =     {multiagent mechanism-design trust},
  url =		 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/dash04a.pdf},
  googleid = 	 {ORlqgLrh5u0J:scholar.google.com/},
  cluster = 	 {17142637222766975289}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:14 EST 2011