Vidal's libraryTitle: | Trust-Based Mechanism Design |
Author: | Rajdeep Dash, Sarvapali Ramchurn, and Nicholas Jennings |
Book Tittle: | Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems |
Pages: | 748--755 |
Publisher: | ACM |
Year: | 2004 |
Abstract: | We define trust-based mechanism design as an augmentation of traditional mechanism design in which agents take into account the degree of trust that they have in their counterparts when determining their allocations. To this end, we develop an efficient, individually rational, and incentive compatible mechanism based on trust. This mechanism is embedded in a task allocation scenario in which the trust in an agent is derived from the reported performance success of that agent by all the other agents in the system. We also empirically study the evolution of our mechanism when iterated and show that, in the long run, it always chooses the most successful and cheapest agents to fulfill an allocation and chooses better allocations than other comparable models when faced with biased reporting. |
Cited by 28 - Google Scholar
@InProceedings{dash04a,
author = {Rajdeep Dash and Sarvapali Ramchurn and Nicholas
Jennings},
title = {Trust-Based Mechanism Design},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Third International Joint
Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent
Systems},
pages = {748--755},
year = 2004,
publisher = {{ACM}},
abstract = {We define trust-based mechanism design as an
augmentation of traditional mechanism design in
which agents take into account the degree of trust
that they have in their counterparts when
determining their allocations. To this end, we
develop an efficient, individually rational, and
incentive compatible mechanism based on trust. This
mechanism is embedded in a task allocation scenario
in which the trust in an agent is derived from the
reported performance success of that agent by all
the other agents in the system. We also empirically
study the evolution of our mechanism when iterated
and show that, in the long run, it always chooses
the most successful and cheapest agents to fulfill
an allocation and chooses better allocations than
other comparable models when faced with biased
reporting.},
keywords = {multiagent mechanism-design trust},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/dash04a.pdf},
googleid = {ORlqgLrh5u0J:scholar.google.com/},
cluster = {17142637222766975289}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:14 EST 2011