

Learning in Multiagent Systems: An Introduction from a Game-Theoretic Perspective

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Abstract. We introduce the topic of learning in multiagent systems. We first provide a quick introduction to the field of game theory, focusing on the equilibrium concepts of iterated dominance, and Nash equilibrium. We show some of the most relevant findings in the theory of learning in games, including theorems on fictitious play, replicator dynamics, and evolutionary stable strategies. The CLRI theory and n-level learning agents are introduced as attempts to apply some of these findings to the problem of engineering multiagent systems with learning agents. Finally, we summarize some of the remaining challenges in the field of learning in multiagent systems.

1 Introduction

The engineering of multiagent systems composed of learning agents brings together techniques from machine learning, game theory, utility theory, and complex systems. A designer must choose carefully which machine-learning algorithm to use since otherwise the system's behavior will be unpredictable and often undesirable. Fortunately, we can use the tools from these areas in an effort to predict the expected system behaviors. In this article we introduce these techniques and explain how they are used in the engineering of learning multiagent systems.

The goal of machine learning research is the development of algorithms that increase the ability of an agent to match a set of inputs to their corresponding outputs [7]. That is, we assume the existence of a large, sometimes infinite, set of examples E . Each example $e \in E$ is a pair $e = \{a, b\}$ where $a \in A$ represents the input the agent receives and $b \in B$ is the output the agent should produce when receiving this input. The agent must find a function f which maps $A \rightarrow B$ for as many examples of A as possible. In a controlled test the set E is usually first divided into a *training set* which is used for training the agent, and a *testing set* which is used for testing the performance of the agent. In some scenarios it is impossible to first train the agent and then test it. In these cases the training and testing examples are interleaved. The agent's performance is assessed on an ongoing manner.

When a learning agent is placed in a multiagent scenario these fundamental assumptions of machine learning are violated. The agent is no longer learning

to extrapolate from the examples it has seen of fixed set E , instead it's target concept keeps changing, leading to a moving target function problem [10]. In general, however, the target concept does not change randomly; it changes based on the learning dynamics of the other agents in the system. Since these agents also learn using machine learning algorithms we are left with some hope that we might someday be able to understand the complex dynamics of these type of systems.

Learning agents are most often selfish utility maximizers. These agents often face each other in encounters where the simultaneous actions of a set of agents leads to different utility payoffs for all the participants. For example, in a market-based setting a set of agents might submit their bids to a first-price sealed-bid auction. The outcome of this auction will result in a utility gain or loss for all the agents. In a robotic setting two agents headed in a collision course towards each other have to decide whether to stay the course or to swerve. The results of their combined actions have direct results in the utilities the agents receive from their actions. We are solely concerned with learning agents that maximize their own utility. We believe that systems where agents share partial results or otherwise help each other can be considered extension on traditional machine learning research.

2 Game Theory

Game theory provides us with the mathematical tools to understand the possible strategies that utility-maximizing agents might use when making a choice. It is mostly concerned with modeling the decision process of rational humans, a fact that should be kept in mind as we consider its applicability to multiagent systems.

The simplest type of game considered in game theory is the *single-shot simultaneous-move* game. In this game all agents must take one action. All actions are effectively simultaneous. Each agent receives a utility that is a function of the combined set of actions. In an *extended-form* game the players take turns and receive a payoff at the end of a series of actions. A single-shot game is a good model for the types of situations often faced by agents in a multiagent system where the encounters mostly require coordination. The extended-form games are best suited to modeling more complex scenarios where each successive move places the agents in a different state. Many scenarios that first appear like they would need an extended-form game can actually be described by a series of single-shot games. In fact, that is the approach taken by many multiagent systems researchers.

In the one-shot simultaneous-move game we say that each agent i chooses a *strategy* $s_i \in S_i$, where S_i is the set of all strategies for agent i . These strategies represent the actions the agent can take. When we say that i chooses strategy s_i we mean that it chooses to take action s_i . The set of all strategies chosen by all the agents is the *strategy profile* for that game and it is denoted by $s \in S \equiv \times_{i=1}^I S_i$. Once all the agents make their choices and form the strategy profile s

	A	B
A	1,2	3,4
B	3,2	2,1

Fig. 1. Sample two-player game matrix. Agent 1 chooses from the rows and agent 2 chooses from the columns.

then each agent i receives a *utility* which is given by the function $u_i(s)$. Notice that a player’s utility depends on the choices made by all the agents.

Two player games involve only two players, i and j . They are often represented using a game matrix such as the one shown in Figure 1. In that matrix we see that if agent 1 (the one who chooses from the rows) chooses action A and agent 2 chooses action B then agent 1 will receive a utility of 3 while agent 2 receives a utility of 4. Using our notation for strategies we would say that if the strategy profile is (s_1, s_2) then the payoff vector is

$$(u_1(s_1, s_2), u_2(s_1, s_2))$$

It is possible that a player will choose randomly between its action choices, using different prior probabilities for each choice. These types of strategies are called *mixed strategies* and they are a probability distribution over an agent’s actions. We say that a mixed strategy for agent i is $\sigma_i \in \Sigma_i \equiv P(S_i)$ where $P(S_i)$ is the set of all probability distributions over the set of pure strategies S_i . Although a real agent can not take a “mixed action”, mixed strategies are useful abstractions since they allow us to model agents who might use some randomization subroutine to choose their action.

3 Solution Concepts

Much of the work in game theory has concentrated in the definition of plausible solution concepts. A solution concept tries to define the set of actions that a set of rational agents will choose when faced with a game. The most common assumptions are that the agents are rational, have common knowledge¹ of the payoffs in the game matrix, and that they are intelligent enough to re-create the thought process that the mathematician went through to come up with the solution concept. As such, most solution concepts are geared towards an understanding of how smart, well-informed people would act. They are not necessarily meant to explain the behavior of machine-learning agents. Still, the fact that they provide the “best” solution makes them a useful tool.

3.1 Iterated Dominance

The iterated dominance approach is to successively eliminate from consideration those actions that are worst than some other action, no matter what the other

¹ Common knowledge about p means that everybody knows that everybody knows, and so on to infinity, about p .

	A	B
A	8,2	9,4
B	1,2	3,1

Fig. 2. A game where agent 1’s action B is dominated by A.

player does. For example, in Figure 2 we see a game where agent 1’s action B is dominated by A. That is, no matter what agent 2 does, agent 1 should choose action A. Then, if agent 1 chooses action A then agent 2 should choose action B. Therefore, the solution strategy profile for this game is (A, B) .

Formally, we say that a strategy σ_i is *strictly dominated* for agent i if there is some other strategy $\tilde{\sigma}_i \in \Sigma_i$ for which $u_i(\tilde{\sigma}_i, \sigma_{-i}) > u_i(\sigma_i, \sigma_{-i})$ for all σ_{-i} , where σ_{-i} is a set of strategies for all agents except i . Notice that the inequality sign is a greater-than. If we change that sign to a greater-than-or-equal then we have the definition for a *weakly dominated* strategy.

There is no reason for a rational agent to choose a strictly dominated strategy. That is, there is no reason for an agent to choose σ_i when there exists a $\tilde{\sigma}_i$ which will give it a better utility no matter what the other agents do. Similarly, there is no reason for the agent to choose a weakly dominated strategy. Of course, this reasoning relies on the assumption that the agent can indeed determine the existence of a $\tilde{\sigma}_i$. This assumption can be hard to justify in cases where the better strategy is a mixed strategy where the agent has an infinite number of possible strategies to verify, or in cases where the number of actions and agents is too large to handle.

The iterated dominance algorithm consists of calculating all the strategies that are dominated for all the players, eliminating those strategies from consideration, and repeating the process until no more strategies are dominated. At that point it might be the case that only one strategy profile is left available. In this case that profile is the one all agents should play. However, in many cases the algorithm still leaves us with a sizable game matrix with a large number of possible strategy profiles. The algorithm then serves only to reduce the size of the problem.

3.2 Nash Equilibrium

The Nash equilibrium solution concept is popular because it provides a solution where other solution concepts fail. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile is defined as $\hat{\sigma}$ such that for all agents i it is true that there is no strategy better than $\hat{\sigma}_i$ given that all the other agents take the actions prescribed by $\hat{\sigma}_{-i}$. Formally, we say that $\hat{\sigma}$ is a Nash equilibrium strategy profile if for all i it is true that $\hat{\sigma}_i \in BR_i(\hat{\sigma}_{-i})$, where $BR_i(s_{-i})$ is the best response for i to s_{-i} . That is, given that everyone else plays the strategy given by the Nash equilibrium the best strategy for any agent is the one given by the Nash equilibrium. A strict Nash equilibrium states that $\hat{\sigma}_i$ is strictly (i.e., greater than) better than any other alternative.

It has been shown that every game has at least one Nash equilibrium, as long as mixed strategies are allowed. The Nash equilibrium has the advantage of being stable under single agent desertions. That is, if the system is in a Nash equilibrium then no agent, working by itself, will be tempted to take a different action. However, it is possible for two or more agents to conspire together and find a set of actions which are better for them. This means that the Nash equilibrium is not stable if we allow the formation of coalitions.

Another problem we face when using the Nash equilibrium is the fact that a game can have multiple Nash equilibria. In these cases we do not know which one will be chosen, if any. The Nash equilibrium could also be a mixed strategy for some agent while in the real world the agent has only discrete actions available. In both of these cases the Nash equilibrium is not sufficient to identify a unique strategy profile that rational agents are expected to play. As such, further studies of the dynamics of the system must be carried out in order to refine the Nash equilibrium solution. The theory of learning in games—a branch of game theory—has studied how simple learning mechanisms lead to equilibrium strategies.

4 Learning in Games

The theory of learning in games studies the equilibrium concepts dictated by various simple learning mechanisms. That is, while the Nash equilibrium is based on the assumption of perfectly rational players, in learning in games the assumption is that the agents use some kind of algorithm. The theory determines the equilibrium strategy that will be arrived at by the various learning mechanisms and maps these equilibria to the standard solution concepts, if possible. Many learning mechanisms have been studied. The most common of them are explained in the next few sub-sections.

4.1 Fictitious Play

A widely studied model of learning in games is the process of fictitious play. In it agents assume that their opponents are playing a fixed strategy. The agents use their past experiences to build a model of the opponent's strategy and use this model to choose their own action. Mathematicians have studied these types of games in order to determine when and whether the system converges to a stable strategy.

Fictitious play uses a simple form of learning where an agent remembers everything the other agents have done and uses this information to build a probability distribution for the other agents' expected strategy. Formally, for the two agent (i and j) case we say that i maintains a weight function $k_i : S_j \rightarrow \mathcal{R}^+$. The weight function changes over time as the agent learns. The weight function at time t is represented by k_i^t which keeps a count of how many times each strategy has been played. When at time $t - 1$ opponent j plays strategy s_j^{t-1}

	A	B
A	0,0	1,1
B	1,1	0,0

Fig. 3. A game matrix with an infinite cycle.

then i updates its weight function with

$$k_i^t(s_j) = k_i^{t-1}(s_j) + \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } s_j^{t-1} = s_j, \\ 0 & \text{if } s_j^{t-1} \neq s_j. \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

Using this weight function, agent i can now assign a probability to j playing any of its $s_j \in S_j$ strategies with

$$\mathbf{Pr}_i^t[s_j] = \frac{k_i^t(s_j)}{\sum_{\tilde{s}_j \in S_j} k_i^t(\tilde{s}_j)}. \quad (2)$$

Player i then determines the strategy that will give it the highest expected utility given that j will play each of its $s_j \in S_j$ with probability $\mathbf{Pr}_i^t[s_j]$. That is, i determines its best response to a probability distribution over j 's possible strategies. This amounts to i assuming that j 's strategy at each time is taken from some fixed but unknown probability distribution.

Several interesting results have been derived by researchers in this area. These results assume that all players are using fictitious play. In [3] it was shown that the following two propositions hold.

Proposition 1. *If s is a strict Nash equilibrium and it is played at time t then it will be played at all times greater than t .*

Intuitively we can see that if the fictitious play algorithm leads to all players to play the same Nash equilibrium then, afterward, they will increase the probability that all others are playing the equilibrium. Since, by definition, the best response of a player when everyone else is playing a strict Nash equilibrium is to play the same equilibrium, all players will play the same strategy and the next time. The same holds true for every time after that.

Proposition 2. *If fictitious play converges to a pure strategy then that strategy must be a Nash equilibrium.*

We can show this by contradiction. If fictitious play converges to a strategy that is not a Nash equilibrium then this means that the best response for at least one of the players is not the same as the convergent strategy. Therefore, that player will take that action at the next time, taking the system away from the strategy profile it was supposed to have converged to.

An obvious problem with the solutions provided by fictitious play can be seen in the existence of infinite cycles of behaviors. An example is illustrated by the

game matrix in Figure 3. If the players start with initial weights of $k_1^0(A) = 1$, $k_1^0(B) = 1.5$, $k_2^0(A) = 1$, and $k_2^0(B) = 1.5$ they will both believe that the other will play B and will, therefore, play A . The weights will then be updated to $k_1^1(A) = 2$, $k_1^1(B) = 1.5$, $k_2^1(A) = 2$, and $k_2^1(B) = 1.5$. Next time, both agents will believe that the other will play A so both will play B . The agents will engage in an endless cycle where they alternatively play (A, A) and (B, B) . The agents end up receiving the worst possible payoff.

This example illustrates the type of problems we encounter when adding learning to multiagent systems. While we would hope that the machine learning algorithm we use will be able to discern this simple pattern and exploit it, most learning algorithms can easily fall into cycles that are not much complicated than this one. One common strategy for avoiding this problem is the use of randomness. Agents will sometimes take a random action in an effort to exit possible loops and to explore the search space. It is interesting to note that, as in the example from Figure 3, it is often the case that the loops the agents fall in often reflect one of the mixed strategy Nash equilibria for the game. That is, $(.5, .5)$ is a Nash equilibrium for this game. Unfortunately, if the agents are synchronized, as in this case, the implementation of a mixed strategy could lead to a lower payoff.

Games with more than two players require that we decide whether the agent should learn individual models of each of the other agents independently or a joint probability distribution over their combined strategies. Individual models assume that each agent operates independently while the joint distributions capture the possibility that the others agents' strategies are correlated. Unfortunately, for any interesting system the set of all possible strategy profiles is too large to explore—it grows exponentially with the number of agents. Therefore, most learning systems assume that all agents operate independently so they need to maintain only one model per agent.

4.2 Replicator Dynamics

Another widely studied model is *replicator dynamics*. This model assumes that the percentage of agents playing a particular strategy will grow in proportion to how well that strategy performs in the population. A homogeneous population of agents is assumed. The agents are randomly paired in order to play a symmetric game, that is, a game where both agents have the same set of possible strategies and receive the same payoffs for the same actions. The replicator dynamics model is meant to capture situations where agents reproduce in proportion to how well they are doing.

Formally, we let $\phi^t(s)$ be the number of agents using strategy s at time t . We can then define

$$\theta^t(s) = \frac{\phi^t(s)}{\sum_{s' \in \mathcal{S}} \phi^t(s')} \quad (3)$$

to be the fraction of agents playing s at time t . The expected utility for an agent playing strategy s at time t is defined as

$$u^t(s) \equiv \sum_{s' \in S} \theta^t(s') u(s, s'), \quad (4)$$

where $u(s, s')$ is the utility than an agent playing s receives against an agent playing s' . Notice that this expected utility assumes that the agents face each other in pairs and choose their opponents randomly. In the replicator dynamics the reproduction rate for each agent is proportional to how well it did on the previous step, that is,

$$\phi^{t+1}(s) = \phi^t(s)(1 + u^t(s)). \quad (5)$$

Notice that the number of agents playing a particular strategy will continue to increase as long as the expected utility for that strategy is greater than zero. Only strategies whose expected utility is negative will decrease in population. It is also true that under these dynamics the size of a population will constantly fluctuate. However, when studying replicator dynamics we ignore the absolute size of the population and focus on the fraction of the population playing a particular strategy, i.e., $\theta^t(s)$, as time goes on. We are also interested in determining if the system's dynamics will converge to some strategy and, if so, which one.

In order to study these systems using the standard solution concepts we view the fraction of agents playing each strategy as a mixed strategy for the game. Since the game is symmetric we can use that strategy as the strategy for both players, so it becomes a strategy profile. We say that the system is in a Nash equilibrium if the fraction of players playing each strategy is the same as the probability that the strategy will be played on a Nash equilibrium. In the case of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium this means that all players are playing the same strategy.

An examination of these systems quickly leads to the conclusion that every Nash equilibrium is a steady state for the replicator dynamics. In the Nash equilibrium all the strategies have the same average payoff since the fraction of other players playing each strategy matches the Nash equilibrium. This fact can be easily proven by contradiction. If an agent had a pure strategy that would return a higher utility than any other strategy then this strategy would be a best response to the Nash equilibrium. If this strategy was different from the Nash equilibrium then we would have a best response to the equilibrium which is not the equilibrium, so the system could not be at a Nash equilibrium.

It has also been shown [4] that a stable steady state of the replicator dynamics is a Nash equilibrium. A stable steady state is one that, after suffering from a small perturbation, is pushed back to the same steady state by the system's dynamics. These states are necessarily Nash equilibria because if they were not then there would exist some particular small perturbation which would take the system away from the steady state. This correspondence was further refined by Bomze [1] who showed that an asymptotically stable steady state corresponds to

a Nash equilibrium that is trembling-hand perfect and isolated. That is, the stable steady states are a refinement on Nash equilibria—only a few Nash equilibria can qualify. On the other hand, it is also possible that a replicator dynamics system will never converge. In fact, there are many examples of simple games with no asymptotically stable steady states.

While replicator dynamics reflect some of the most troublesome aspects of learning in multiagent systems some differences are evident. These differences are mainly due to the replication assumption. Agents are not usually expected to replicate, instead they acquire the strategies of others. For example, in a real multiagent system all the agents might choose to play the strategy that performed best in the last round instead of choosing their next strategy in proportion to how well it did last time. As such, we cannot directly apply the results from replicator dynamics to multiagent systems. However, the convergence of the systems' dynamics to a Nash equilibrium does illustrate the importance of this solution concept as an attractor of learning agent's dynamics.

4.3 Evolutionary Stable Strategies

An Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) is an equilibrium concept applied to dynamic systems such as the replicator dynamics system of the previous section. An ESS is an equilibrium strategy that can overcome the presence of a small number of invaders. That is, if the equilibrium strategy profile is ω and small number ϵ of invaders start playing ω' then ESS states that the existing population should get a higher payoff against the new mixture ($\epsilon\omega' + (1 - \epsilon)\omega$) than the invaders.

It has been shown [9] that an ESS is an asymptotically stable steady state of the replicator dynamics. However, the converse need not be true—a stable state in the replicator dynamics does not need to be an ESS. This means that ESS is a further refinement of the solution concept provided by the replicator dynamics. ESS can be used when we need a very stable equilibrium concept.

5 Learning Agents

The theory of learning in games provides the designer of multiagent systems with many useful tools for determining the possible equilibrium points of a system. Unfortunately, most multiagent systems with learning agents do not converge to an equilibrium. Designers use learning agents because they do not know, at design time, the specific circumstances that the agents will face at run time. If a designer knew the best strategy, that is, the Nash equilibrium strategy, for his agent then he would simply implement this strategy and avoid the complexities of implementing a learning algorithm. Therefore, the only times we will see a multiagent system with learning agents are when the designer cannot predict that an equilibrium solution will emerge.

The two main reasons for this inability to predict the equilibrium solution of a system are the existence of unpredictable environmental changes that affect

the agents’ payoffs and the fact that on many systems an agent only has access to its own set of payoffs—it does not know the payoffs of other agents. These two reasons make it impossible for a designer to predict which equilibria, if any, the system would converge to. However, the agents in the system are still playing a game for which an equilibrium exists, even if the designer cannot predict it at design-time. But, since the actual payoffs keep changing it is often the case that the agents are constantly changing their strategy in order to accommodate the new payoffs.

Learning agents in a multiagent system are faced with a *moving target function problem* [10]. That is, as the agents change their behavior in an effort to maximize their utility their payoffs for those actions change, changing the expected utility of their behavior. The system will likely have non-stationary dynamics—always changing in order to match the new goal. While game theory tells us where the equilibrium points are, given that the payoffs stay fixed, multiagent systems often never get to those points. A system designer needs to know how changes in the design of the system and learning algorithms will affect the time to convergence. This type of information can be determined by using CLRI theory.

5.1 CLRI Theory

The CLRI theory [12] provides a formal method for analyzing a system composed of learning agents and determining how an agent’s learning is expected to affect the learning of other agents in the system. It assumes a system where each agent has a decision function that governs its behavior as well as a target function that describes the agent’s best possible behavior. The target function is unknown to the agent. The goal of the agent’s learning is to have its decision function be an exact duplicate of its target function. Of course, the target function keeps changing as a result of other agents’ learning.

Formally, CLRI theory assumes that there are N agents in the system. The world has a set of discrete states $w \in W$ which are presented to the agent with a probability dictated by the probability distribution $\mathcal{D}(W)$. Each agent $i \in N$ has a set of possible actions A_i where $|A_i| \geq 2$. Time is discrete and indexed by a variable t . At each time t all agents are presented with a new $w \in \mathcal{D}(W)$, take a simultaneous action, and receive some payoff. The scenario is similar to the one assumed by fictitious play except for the addition of w .

Each agent i ’s behavior is defined by a decision function $\delta_i^t(w) : W \rightarrow A$. When i learns at time t that it is in state w it will take action $\delta_i^t(w)$. At any time there is an optimal function for i given by its target function $\Delta_i^t(w)$. Agent i ’s learning algorithm will try to reduce the discrepancy between δ_i and Δ_i by using the payoffs it receives for each action as clues since it does not have direct access to Δ_i . The probability that an agent will take a wrong action is given by its error $e(\delta_i^t) = \Pr[\delta_i^t(w) \neq \Delta_i^t(w) | w \in \mathcal{D}(W)]$. As other agents learn and change their decision function, i ’s target function will also change, leading to the moving target function problem, as depicted in Figure 4.

An agent’s error is based on a fixed probability distribution over world states and a boolean matching between the decision and target functions. These con-




Fig. 4. The moving target function problem.

straints are often too restrictive to properly model many multiagent systems. However, even if the system being modeled does not completely obey these two constraints, the use of the CLRI theory in these cases still gives the designer valuable insight into how changes in the design will affect the dynamics of the system. This practice is akin to the use of Q-learning in non-Markovian games—while Q-learning is only guaranteed to converge if the environment is Markovian, it can still perform well on other domains.

The CLRI theory allows a designer to understand the expected dynamics of the system, regardless of what learning algorithm is used, by modeling the system using four parameters: Change rate, Learning rate, Retention rate, and Impact (CLRI). A designer can determine values for these parameters and then use the CLRI difference equation to determine the expected behavior of the system.

The change rate (c) is the probability that an agent will change at least one of its incorrect mappings in $\delta^t(w)$ for the new $\delta^{t+1}(w)$. It captures the rate at which the agent's learning algorithm tries to change its erroneous mappings. The learning rate (l) is the probability that the agent changes an incorrect mapping to the correct one. That is, the probability that $\delta^{t+1}(w) = \Delta^t(w)$, for all w . By definition, the learning rate must be less than or equal to the change rate, i.e. $l \leq c$. The retention rate (r) represents the probability that the agent will retain its correct mapping. That is, the probability that $\delta^{t+1}(w) = \delta^t(w)$ given that $\delta^t(w) = \Delta^t(w)$.

CLRI defines a volatility term (v) to be the probability that the target function Δ changes from time t to $t + 1$. That is, the probability that $\Delta^t(w) \neq \Delta^{t+1}(w)$. As one would expect, volatility captures the amount of change that the agent must deal with. It can also be viewed as the speed of the target function in the moving target function problem, with the learning and retention rates representing the speed of the decision function. Since the volatility is a dynamic property of the system (usually it can only be calculated by running the system) CLRI provides an impact (I_{ij}) measure. I_{ij} represents the impact that i 's learning has on j 's target function. Specifically, it is the probability that $\Delta_j^t(w)$ will change given that $\delta_i^{t+1}(w) \neq \delta_i^t(w)$.

Someone trying to build a multiagent system with learning agents would determine the appropriate values for c , l , r , and either v or I and then use

$$E[e(\delta_i^{t+1})] = 1 - r_i + v_i \left(\frac{|A_i|r_i - 1}{|A_i| - 1} \right) + e(\delta_i^t) \left(r_i - l_i + v_i \left(\frac{|A_i|(l_i - r_i) + l_i - c_i}{|A_i| - 1} \right) \right) \quad (6)$$

in order to determine the successive expected errors for a typical agent i . This equation relies on a definition of volatility in terms of impact given by

$$\begin{aligned} \forall_{w \in W} v_i^t &= \mathbf{Pr}[\Delta_i^{t+1}(w) \neq \Delta_i^t(w)] \\ &= 1 - \prod_{j \in N_{-i}} (1 - I_{ji} \mathbf{Pr}[\delta_j^{t+1}(w) \neq \delta_j^t(w)]), \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

which makes the simplifying assumption that changes in agents' decision functions will not cancel each other out when calculating their impact on other agents. The difference equation (6) cannot, under most circumstances, be collapsed into a function of t so it must still be iterated over. On the other hand, a careful study of the function and the reasoning behind the choice of the CLRI parameter leads to an intuitive understanding of how changes in these parameters will be reflected in the function and, therefore, the system. A knowledgeable designer can simply use this added understanding to determine the expected behavior of his system under various assumptions. An example of this approach is shown in [2].

For example, it is easy to see that an agent's learning rate and the system's volatility together help to determine how fast, if ever, the agent will reach its target function. A large learning rate means that an agent will change its decision function to almost match the target function. Meanwhile, a low volatility means that the target function will not move much, so it will be easy for the agent to match it. Of course, this type of simple analysis ignores the common situation where the agent's high learning rate is coupled with a high impact on other agents' target function making their volatility much higher. These agents might then have to increase their learning rate and thereby increase the original agent's volatility. Equation (6) is most helpful in these type of feedback situations.

5.2 N-Level Agents

Another issue that arises when building learning agents is the choice of a modeling level. A designer must decide whether his agent will learn to correlate actions with rewards, or will try to learn to predict the expected actions of others and use these predictions along with knowledge of the problem domain to determine its actions, or will try to learn how other agents build models of other agents, etc. These choices are usually referred to as n-level modeling agents—an idea first presented in the recursive modeling method [5] [6].

A 0-level agent is one that does not recognize the existence of other agents in the world. It learns which action to take in each possible state of the world because it receives a reward after its actions. The state is usually defined as a static snapshot of the observable aspects of the agent’s environment. A 1-level agent recognizes that there are other agents in the world whose actions affect its payoff. It also has some knowledge that tells it the utility it will receive given any set of joint actions. This knowledge usually takes the form of a game matrix that only has utility values for the agent. The 1-level agent observes the other agents’ actions and builds probabilistic models of the other agents. It then uses these models to predict their action probability distribution and uses these distributions to determine its best possible action. A 2-level agent believes that all other agents are 1-level agents. It, therefore, builds models of their models of other agents based on the actions it thinks they have seen others take. In essence, the 2-level agent applies the 1-level algorithm to all other agents in an effort to predict their action probability distribution and uses these distributions to determine its best possible actions. A 3-level agent believes that all other agents are 2-level, and so on. Using these guidelines we can determine that fictitious play (Section 4.1) uses 1-level agents while the replicator dynamics (Section 4.2) uses 0-level agents.

These categorizations help us to determine the relative computational costs of each approach and the machine-learning algorithms that are best suited for that learning problem. 0-level is usually the easiest to implement since it only requires the learning of one function and no additional knowledge. 1-level learning requires us to build a model of every agent and can only be implemented if the agent has the knowledge that tells it which action to take given the set of actions that others have taken. This knowledge must be integrated into the agents. However, recent studies in layered learning [8] have shown how some knowledge could be learned in a “training” situation and then fixed into the agent so that other knowledge that uses the first one can be learned, either at runtime or in another training situation. In general, a change in the level that an agent operates on implies a change on the learning problem and the knowledge built into the agent.

Studies with n -level agents have shown [11] that an n -level agent will always perform better in a society full of $(n-1)$ -level agents, and that the computational costs of increasing a level grow exponentially. Meanwhile, the utility gains to the agent grow smaller as the agents in the system increase their level, within an economic scenario. The reason is that an n -level agent is able to exploit the non-equilibrium dynamics of a system composed of $(n-1)$ -level agents. However, as the agents increase their level the system reaches equilibrium faster so the advantages of strategic thinking are reduced—it is best to play the equilibrium strategy and not worry about what others might do. On the other hand, if all agents stopped learning then it would be very easy for a new learning agent to take advantage of them. As such, the research concludes that some of the agents should do some learning some of the time in order to preserve the robustness of the system, even if this learning does not have any direct results.

6 Conclusion

We have seen how game theory and the theory of learning in games provide us with various equilibrium solution concepts and often tell us when some of them will be reached by simple learning models. On the other hand, we have argued that the reason learning is used in a multiagent system is often because there is no known equilibrium or the equilibrium point keeps changing due to outside forces. We have also shown how the CLRI theory and n-level agents are attempts to characterize and predict, to a limited degree, the dynamics of a system given some basic learning parameters.

We conclude that the problems faced by a designer of a learning multiagent systems cannot be solved solely with the tools of game theory. Game theory tells us about possible equilibrium points. However, learning agents are rarely at equilibrium, either because they are not sophisticated enough, because they lack information, or by design. There is a need to explore non-equilibrium systems and to develop more predictive theories which, like CLRI, can tell us how changing either the parameters on the agents' learning algorithms or the rules of the game will affect the expected emergent behavior.

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