Vidal's libraryTitle: | Coalition, Cryptography, and Stability: Mechanisms for Coalition Formation in Task Oriented Domains |
Author: | Gilad Zlotkin and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein |
Book Tittle: | Proceedings of the Eleventh National Conference on Artificial Intelligence |
Pages: | 32--437 |
Publisher: | AAAI Press |
Year: | 1994 |
Abstract: | Negotiation among multiple agents remains an important topic of research in Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI). Most previous work on this subject, however, has focused on bilateral negotiation, deals that are reached between two agents. There has also been research on n-agent agreement which has considered “consensus mechanisms” (such as voting), that allow the full group to coordinate itself. These group decision-making techniques, however, assume that the entire group will (or has to) coordinate its actions. Sub-groups cannot make sub-agreements that exclude other members of the group. In some domains, however, it may be possible for beneficial agreements to be reached among sub-groups of agents, who might be individually motivated to work together to the exclusion of others outside the group. This paper considers this more general case of n-agent coalition formation. We present a simple coalition formation mechanism that uses cryptographic techniques for subadditive Task Oriented Domains. The mechanism is efficient, symmetric, and individual rational. When the domain is also concave, the mechanism also satisfies coalition rationality. |
Cited by 92 - Google Scholar
@InProceedings{zlotkin94a,
author = {Gilad Zlotkin and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein},
title = {Coalition, Cryptography, and Stability: Mechanisms
for Coalition Formation in Task Oriented Domains},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Eleventh National Conference on
Artificial Intelligence},
pages = {32--437},
publisher = {{AAAI} Press},
year = 1994,
cluster = {4644845690219097042},
abstract = {Negotiation among multiple agents remains an
important topic of research in Distributed
Artificial Intelligence (DAI). Most previous work on
this subject, however, has focused on bilateral
negotiation, deals that are reached between two
agents. There has also been research on n-agent
agreement which has considered ``consensus
mechanisms'' (such as voting), that allow the full
group to coordinate itself. These group
decision-making techniques, however, assume that the
entire group will (or has to) coordinate its
actions. Sub-groups cannot make sub-agreements that
exclude other members of the group. In some domains,
however, it may be possible for beneficial
agreements to be reached among sub-groups of agents,
who might be individually motivated to work together
to the exclusion of others outside the group. This
paper considers this more general case of n-agent
coalition formation. We present a simple coalition
formation mechanism that uses cryptographic
techniques for subadditive Task Oriented
Domains. The mechanism is efficient, symmetric, and
individual rational. When the domain is also
concave, the mechanism also satisfies coalition
rationality.},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/zlotkin94a.pdf}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:13:56 EST 2011