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Title: Coalition, Cryptography, and Stability: Mechanisms for Coalition Formation in Task Oriented Domains
Author: Gilad Zlotkin and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
Book Tittle: Proceedings of the Eleventh National Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Pages: 32--437
Publisher: AAAI Press
Year: 1994
Abstract: Negotiation among multiple agents remains an important topic of research in Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI). Most previous work on this subject, however, has focused on bilateral negotiation, deals that are reached between two agents. There has also been research on n-agent agreement which has considered “consensus mechanisms” (such as voting), that allow the full group to coordinate itself. These group decision-making techniques, however, assume that the entire group will (or has to) coordinate its actions. Sub-groups cannot make sub-agreements that exclude other members of the group. In some domains, however, it may be possible for beneficial agreements to be reached among sub-groups of agents, who might be individually motivated to work together to the exclusion of others outside the group. This paper considers this more general case of n-agent coalition formation. We present a simple coalition formation mechanism that uses cryptographic techniques for subadditive Task Oriented Domains. The mechanism is efficient, symmetric, and individual rational. When the domain is also concave, the mechanism also satisfies coalition rationality.

Cited by 92  -  Google Scholar

@InProceedings{zlotkin94a,
  author =	 {Gilad Zlotkin and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein},
  title =	 {Coalition, Cryptography, and Stability: Mechanisms
                  for Coalition Formation in Task Oriented Domains},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the Eleventh National Conference on
                  Artificial Intelligence},
  pages =	 {32--437},
  publisher = 	 {{AAAI} Press},
  year =	 1994,
  cluster = 	 {4644845690219097042},
  abstract =	 {Negotiation among multiple agents remains an
                  important topic of research in Distributed
                  Artificial Intelligence (DAI). Most previous work on
                  this subject, however, has focused on bilateral
                  negotiation, deals that are reached between two
                  agents. There has also been research on n-agent
                  agreement which has considered ``consensus
                  mechanisms'' (such as voting), that allow the full
                  group to coordinate itself. These group
                  decision-making techniques, however, assume that the
                  entire group will (or has to) coordinate its
                  actions. Sub-groups cannot make sub-agreements that
                  exclude other members of the group. In some domains,
                  however, it may be possible for beneficial
                  agreements to be reached among sub-groups of agents,
                  who might be individually motivated to work together
                  to the exclusion of others outside the group. This
                  paper considers this more general case of n-agent
                  coalition formation. We present a simple coalition
                  formation mechanism that uses cryptographic
                  techniques for subadditive Task Oriented
                  Domains. The mechanism is efficient, symmetric, and
                  individual rational. When the domain is also
                  concave, the mechanism also satisfies coalition
                  rationality.},
  url =		 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/zlotkin94a.pdf}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:13:56 EST 2011