Vidal's libraryTitle: | Coalition Games in Open Anonymous Environments |
Author: | Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, and Atshushi Iwasaki |
Book Tittle: | Proceedings of the Twentieth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence |
Pages: | 509--514 |
Publisher: | AAAI Press |
Year: | 2005 |
Crossref: | aaai05 |
Abstract: | Coalition formation is a key aspect of automated negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for coalitions to be stable, a key question that must be answered is how the gains from cooperation are to be distributed. Various solution concepts (such as the Shapley value, core, least core, and nucleolus) have been proposed. In this paper, we demonstrate how these concepts are vulnerable to various kinds of manipulations in open anonymous environments such as the Internet. These manipulations include submitting false names (one acting as many), collusion (many acting as one), and the hiding of skills. To address these threats, we introduce a new solution concept called the anonymity-proof core, which is robust to these manipulations. We show that the anonymity-proof core is characterized by certain simple axiomatic conditions. Furthermore, we show that by relaxing these conditions, we obtain a concept called the least anonymity-proof core, which is guaranteed to be non-empty. We also show that computational hardness of manipulation may provide an alternative barrier to manipulation. |
@InProceedings{yokoo05a,
author = {Makoto Yokoo and Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas
Sandholm and Naoki Ohta and Atshushi Iwasaki},
title = {Coalition Games in Open Anonymous Environments},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twentieth National Conference on
Artificial Intelligence},
crossref = {aaai05},
pages = {509--514},
year = 2005,
address = {Menlog Park, California},
publisher = {{AAAI Press}},
abstract = {Coalition formation is a key aspect of automated
negotiation among self-interested agents. In order
for coalitions to be stable, a key question that
must be answered is how the gains from cooperation
are to be distributed. Various solution concepts
(such as the Shapley value, core, least core, and
nucleolus) have been proposed. In this paper, we
demonstrate how these concepts are vulnerable to
various kinds of manipulations in open anonymous
environments such as the Internet. These
manipulations include submitting false names (one
acting as many), collusion (many acting as one), and
the hiding of skills. To address these threats, we
introduce a new solution concept called the
anonymity-proof core, which is robust to these
manipulations. We show that the anonymity-proof core
is characterized by certain simple axiomatic
conditions. Furthermore, we show that by relaxing
these conditions, we obtain a concept called the
least anonymity-proof core, which is guaranteed to
be non-empty. We also show that computational
hardness of manipulation may provide an alternative
barrier to manipulation.},
keywords = {multiagent coalitions security},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/yokoo05a.pdf}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:20 EST 2011