Vidal's libraryTitle: | A stable and efficient buyer coalition formation scheme for e-marketplaces |
Author: | Junichi Yamamoto and Katia Sycara |
Book Tittle: | Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Autonomous Agents |
Pages: | 576--583 |
Publisher: | ACM Press |
Year: | 2001 |
DOI: | 10.1145/375735.376452 |
Abstract: | Buyer coalitions are beneficial in e-marketplaces because they allow buyers to take advantage of volume discounts. However, existing buyer coalition formation schemes do not provide buyers with any means to declare and match their preferences or to calculate the division of the surplus in a stable manner. Concepts and algorithms for coalition formation have been investigated in game theory and multi-agent systems research, but because of the computational complexity, they cannot deal with thousands of buyers which could join a coalition in practice. In this paper, we propose a new buyer coalition formation scheme GroupBuyAuction. At GroupBuyAuction, buyers form a group based on a category of items. A buyer can post an OR-asking for multiple items within a category. An OR-asking is a list of items indicating that the buyer would buy any one of the items in the list with some particular reservation price. Sellers bid volume discount prices. The group leader agent splits the group into sub groups (coalitions), selects a winning seller for each coalition, and calculates surplus division among buyers. We prove that this scheme guarantees the stability in surplus division within each coalition in terms of the core in game theory. Simulation results show that, under most conditions, our scheme increases buyers' utility, and allows more buyers to obtain items compared to traditional group buying schemes, such as those used at existing commercial WWW sites. |
Cited by 58 - Google Scholar
@InProceedings{yamamoto01a,
author = {Junichi Yamamoto and Katia Sycara},
title = {A stable and efficient buyer coalition formation
scheme for e-marketplaces},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on
Autonomous Agents},
year = {2001},
pages = {576--583},
address = {Montreal, Canada},
publisher = {{ACM} Press},
abstract = {Buyer coalitions are beneficial in e-marketplaces
because they allow buyers to take advantage of
volume discounts. However, existing buyer coalition
formation schemes do not provide buyers with any
means to declare and match their preferences or to
calculate the division of the surplus in a stable
manner. Concepts and algorithms for coalition
formation have been investigated in game theory and
multi-agent systems research, but because of the
computational complexity, they cannot deal with
thousands of buyers which could join a coalition in
practice. In this paper, we propose a new buyer
coalition formation scheme GroupBuyAuction. At
GroupBuyAuction, buyers form a group based on a
category of items. A buyer can post an OR-asking for
multiple items within a category. An OR-asking is a
list of items indicating that the buyer would buy
any one of the items in the list with some
particular reservation price. Sellers bid volume
discount prices. The group leader agent splits the
group into sub groups (coalitions), selects a
winning seller for each coalition, and calculates
surplus division among buyers. We prove that this
scheme guarantees the stability in surplus division
within each coalition in terms of the core in game
theory. Simulation results show that, under most
conditions, our scheme increases buyers' utility,
and allows more buyers to obtain items compared to
traditional group buying schemes, such as those used
at existing commercial WWW sites.},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/yamamoto01a.pdf},
doi = {10.1145/375735.376452},
cluster = {476903579489648293}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:15:17 EST 2011