Vidal's library
Title: On the computational complexity of coalitional resource games
Author: Michael Wooldridge and Paul E. Dunnet
Journal: Artificial Intelligence
Volume: 170
Pages: 835--871
Year: 2006
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2006.03.003
Abstract: We study Coalitional Resource Games (crgs), a variation of Qualitative Coalitional Games (qcgs) in which each agent is endowed with a set of resources, and the ability of a coalition to bring about a set of goals depends on whether they are collectively endowed with the necessary resources. We investigate and classify the computational complexity of a number of natural decision problems for crgs, over and above those previously investigated for qcgs in general. For example, we show that the complexity of determining whether conflict is inevitable between two coalitions with respect to some stated resource bound (i.e., a limit value for every resource) is co-np-complete. We then investigate the relationship between crgs and qcgs, and in particular the extent to which it is possible to translate between the two models. We first characterise the complexity of determining equivalence between crgs and qcgs. We then show that it is always possible to translate any given crg into a succinct equivalent qcg, and that it is not always possible to translate a qcg into an equivalent crg; we establish some necessary and some sufficient conditions for a translation from qcgs to crgs to be possible, and show that even where an equivalent crg exists, it may have size exponential in the number of goals and agents of its source qcg.



@Article{wooldridge06a,
  author =	 {Michael Wooldridge and Paul E. Dunnet},
  title =	 {On the computational complexity of coalitional
                  resource games},
  journal =	 {Artificial Intelligence},
  year =	 2006,
  volume =	 170,
  pages =	 {835--871},
  abstract =	 {We study Coalitional Resource Games (crgs), a
                  variation of Qualitative Coalitional Games (qcgs) in
                  which each agent is endowed with a set of resources,
                  and the ability of a coalition to bring about a set
                  of goals depends on whether they are collectively
                  endowed with the necessary resources. We investigate
                  and classify the computational complexity of a
                  number of natural decision problems for crgs, over
                  and above those previously investigated for qcgs in
                  general. For example, we show that the complexity of
                  determining whether conflict is inevitable between
                  two coalitions with respect to some stated resource
                  bound (i.e., a limit value for every resource) is
                  co-np-complete. We then investigate the relationship
                  between crgs and qcgs, and in particular the extent
                  to which it is possible to translate between the two
                  models. We first characterise the complexity of
                  determining equivalence between crgs and qcgs. We
                  then show that it is always possible to translate
                  any given crg into a succinct equivalent qcg, and
                  that it is not always possible to translate a qcg
                  into an equivalent crg; we establish some necessary
                  and some sufficient conditions for a translation
                  from qcgs to crgs to be possible, and show that even
                  where an equivalent crg exists, it may have size
                  exponential in the number of goals and agents of its
                  source qcg.},
  keywords = 	 {multiagent coalitions},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/wooldridge06a.pdf},
  doi = 	 {10.1016/j.artint.2006.03.003}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:34 EST 2011