Vidal's libraryTitle: | Multi-Agent Algorithms for Solving Graphical Games |
Author: | David Vickrey and Daphne Koller |
Book Tittle: | Proceedings of the Eighteenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence |
Pages: | 345--351 |
Year: | 2002 |
Abstract: | Consider the problem of a group of agents trying to find a stable strategy profile for a joint interaction. A standard approach is to describe the situation as a single multiplayer game and find an equilibrium strategy profile of that game. However, most algorithms for finding equilibria are computationally expensive; they are also centralized, requiring that all relevant payoff information be available to a single agent (or computer) who must determine the entire equilibrium profile. In this paper, we exploit two ideas to address these problems. We consider structured game representations, where the interaction between the agents is sparse, an assumption that holds in many real-world situations. We also consider the slightly relaxed task of finding an approximate equilibrium. We present two algorithms for finding approximate equilibria in these games, one based on a hill-climbing approach and one on constraint satisfaction. We show that these algorithms exploit the game structure to achieve faster computation. They are also inherently local, requiring only limited communication between directly interacting agents. They can thus be scaled to games involving large numbers of agents, provided the interaction between the agents is not too dense. |
Cited by 68 - Google Scholar
@InProceedings{vickrey02a,
author = {David Vickrey and Daphne Koller},
title = {Multi-Agent Algorithms for Solving Graphical Games},
googleid = {FY8qu4e2I-IJ:scholar.google.com/},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Eighteenth National Conference on
Artificial Intelligence},
pages = {345--351},
year = 2002,
abstract = {Consider the problem of a group of agents trying to
find a stable strategy profile for a joint
interaction. A standard approach is to describe the
situation as a single multiplayer game and find an
equilibrium strategy profile of that game. However,
most algorithms for finding equilibria are
computationally expensive; they are also
centralized, requiring that all relevant payoff
information be available to a single agent (or
computer) who must determine the entire equilibrium
profile. In this paper, we exploit two ideas to
address these problems. We consider structured game
representations, where the interaction between the
agents is sparse, an assumption that holds in many
real-world situations. We also consider the slightly
relaxed task of finding an approximate
equilibrium. We present two algorithms for finding
approximate equilibria in these games, one based on
a hill-climbing approach and one on constraint
satisfaction. We show that these algorithms exploit
the game structure to achieve faster
computation. They are also inherently local,
requiring only limited communication between
directly interacting agents. They can thus be scaled
to games involving large numbers of agents, provided
the interaction between the agents is not too
dense.},
keywords = {multiagent game-theory},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/vickrey02a.ps},
cluster = {16295068570833555221}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:15:38 EST 2011