Vidal's libraryTitle: | Strategy/False-name Proof Protocols for Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Procurement Auction |
Author: | Takayuki Suyama and Makoto Yokoo |
Book Tittle: | Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems |
Pages: | 160--167 |
Publisher: | ACM |
Year: | 2004 |
Abstract: | In this paper, we investigate a model of a combinatorial, procurement multi-attribute auction, in which each sales item is defined by several attributes called quality, the buyer is the auctioneer (e.g., a government), and the sellers are the bidders. Furthermore, there exist multiple items and both buyer and sellers can have arbitrary (e.g., substitutable/complementary) preferences on a bundle of items. Our goal is to develop a protocol that is strategyproof for sellers. We first present a VCG-type protocol. As in a standard combinatorial auction, a VCG-type protocol is not false-name-proof, i.e., it is vulnerable against manipulations using multiple identifiers. Next, we show that any strategy-proof protocol in this model can be represented as a framework called Price-Oriented Rationing-Free (PORF) protocol, in which for each bidder, for each bundle of items, and for each quality, the payment for the bidder is determined independently of his own declaration, and the bidder can obtain a bundle that maximizes his utility independently of the allocations of other bidders. We develop a false-name-proof protocol in this model. |
Cited by 13 - Google Scholar
@InProceedings{suyama04a,
author = {Takayuki Suyama and Makoto Yokoo},
title = {Strategy/False-name Proof Protocols for
Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Procurement Auction},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Third International Joint
Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent
Systems},
pages = {160--167},
year = 2004,
publisher = {{ACM}},
abstract = {In this paper, we investigate a model of a
combinatorial, procurement multi-attribute auction,
in which each sales item is defined by several
attributes called quality, the buyer is the
auctioneer (e.g., a government), and the sellers are
the bidders. Furthermore, there exist multiple items
and both buyer and sellers can have arbitrary (e.g.,
substitutable/complementary) preferences on a bundle
of items. Our goal is to develop a protocol that is
strategyproof for sellers. We first present a
VCG-type protocol. As in a standard combinatorial
auction, a VCG-type protocol is not
false-name-proof, i.e., it is vulnerable against
manipulations using multiple identifiers. Next, we
show that any strategy-proof protocol in this model
can be represented as a framework called
Price-Oriented Rationing-Free (PORF) protocol, in
which for each bidder, for each bundle of items, and
for each quality, the payment for the bidder is
determined independently of his own declaration, and
the bidder can obtain a bundle that maximizes his
utility independently of the allocations of other
bidders. We develop a false-name-proof protocol in
this model.},
keywords = {multiagent auctions security combinatorial},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/suyama04a.pdf},
comment = {masrg},
googleid = {8-sqX6mRgbEJ:scholar.google.com/},
cluster = {12790664573341068275}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:13 EST 2011