Vidal's library
Title: On the emergence of social conventions: modeling, analysis, and simulations
Author: Yoav Shoham and Moshe Tennenholtz
Journal: Artificial Intelligence
Volume: 94
Pages: 139--166
Year: 1997
Abstract: We define the notion of social conventions in a standard game-theoretic framework, and identify various criteria of consistency of such conventions with the principle of individual rationality. We then investigate the emergence of such conventions in a stochastic setting; we do so within a stylized framework currently popular in economic circles, namely that of stochastic games. This framework comes in several forms; in our setting agents interact with each other through a random process, and accumulate information about the system. As they do so, they continually reevaluate their current choice of strategy in light of the accumulated information. We introduce a simple and natural strategy-selection rule, called highest cumulative reward (HCR). We show a class of games in which HCR guarantees eventual convergence to a rationally acceptable social convention. Most importantly, we investigate the efficiency with which such social conventions are achieved. We give an analytic lower bound on this rate, and then present results about how HCR works out in practice. Specifically, we pick one of the most basic games, namely a basic coordination game (as defined by Lewis), and through extensive computer simulations determine not only the effect of applying HCR, but also the subtle effects of various system parameters, such as the amount of memory and the frequency of update performed by all agents.

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@Article{shoham97a,
  author =	 {Yoav Shoham and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  title =	 {On the emergence of social conventions: modeling,
                  analysis, and simulations},
  googleid =	 {MnR3R4DssjcJ:scholar.google.com/},
  journal =	 {Artificial Intelligence},
  year =	 1997,
  volume =	 94,
  pages =	 {139--166},
  abstract =	 {We define the notion of social conventions in a
                  standard game-theoretic framework, and identify
                  various criteria of consistency of such conventions
                  with the principle of individual rationality. We
                  then investigate the emergence of such conventions
                  in a stochastic setting; we do so within a stylized
                  framework currently popular in economic circles,
                  namely that of stochastic games. This framework
                  comes in several forms; in our setting agents
                  interact with each other through a random process,
                  and accumulate information about the system. As they
                  do so, they continually reevaluate their current
                  choice of strategy in light of the accumulated
                  information. We introduce a simple and natural
                  strategy-selection rule, called highest cumulative
                  reward (HCR). We show a class of games in which HCR
                  guarantees eventual convergence to a rationally
                  acceptable social convention. Most importantly, we
                  investigate the efficiency with which such social
                  conventions are achieved. We give an analytic lower
                  bound on this rate, and then present results about
                  how HCR works out in practice. Specifically, we pick
                  one of the most basic games, namely a basic
                  coordination game (as defined by Lewis), and through
                  extensive computer simulations determine not only
                  the effect of applying HCR, but also the subtle
                  effects of various system parameters, such as the
                  amount of memory and the frequency of update
                  performed by all agents.},
  keywords =     {multiagent learning game-theory},
  url =		 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/shoham97a.pdf},
  cluster = 	 {4013530253639513138}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:14:12 EST 2011