Vidal's library
Title: Reciprocal Negotiation over Shared Resources in Agent Societies
Author: Sabyasachi Saha and Sandip Sen
Book Tittle: Proceedings of the Sixth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Pages: 771--773
Year: 2007
Crossref: aamas07
Abstract: We are interested in domains where an agent repeatedly negotiates with other agents over shared resources where the demand or utility to the agent for the shared resources vary over time. We propose a protocol that will maximize social welfare if agents reveal their true preferences in every negotiation. The protocol, however, is not truth-revealing and selfish agents have the incentive to artificially inflate preferences. We use a probabilistic reciprocative behavior that discourages the reporting of false preferences. This reciprocative behavior promotes cooperation in repeated negotiations and improves both individual and group longterm payoff. We characterize environmental conditions under which agents can develop and sustain mutually beneficial relationships with similar agents and avoid exploitation by different types of selfish agents.



@InProceedings{saha07a,
  author =	 {Sabyasachi Saha and Sandip Sen},
  title =	 {Reciprocal Negotiation over Shared Resources in
                  Agent Societies},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the Sixth International Joint
                  Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
                  Systems},
  crossref =	 {aamas07},
  pages =	 {771--773},
  year =	 2007,
  abstract =	 {We are interested in domains where an agent
                  repeatedly negotiates with other agents over shared
                  resources where the demand or utility to the agent
                  for the shared resources vary over time. We propose
                  a protocol that will maximize social welfare if
                  agents reveal their true preferences in every
                  negotiation. The protocol, however, is not
                  truth-revealing and selfish agents have the
                  incentive to artificially inflate preferences. We
                  use a probabilistic reciprocative behavior that
                  discourages the reporting of false preferences. This
                  reciprocative behavior promotes cooperation in
                  repeated negotiations and improves both individual
                  and group longterm payoff. We characterize
                  environmental conditions under which agents can
                  develop and sustain mutually beneficial
                  relationships with similar agents and avoid
                  exploitation by different types of selfish agents.},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/saha07a.pdf}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:50 EST 2011