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Title: Modeling Bounded Rationality
Author: Ariel Rubinstein
Publisher: MIT Press
Year: 1997
Abstract: The notion of bounded rationality was initiated in the 1950s by Herbert Simon; only recently has it influenced mainstream economics. In this book, Ariel Rubinstein defines models of bounded rationality as those in which elements of the process of choice are explicitly embedded. The book focuses on the challenges of modeling bounded rationality, rather than on substantial economic implications. In the first part of the book, the author considers the modeling of choice. After discussing some psychological findings, he proceeds to the modeling of procedural rationality, knowledge, memory, the choice of what to know, and group decisions. In the second part, he discusses the fundamental difficulties of modeling bounded rationality in games. He begins with the modeling of a game with procedural rational players and then surveys repeated games with complexity considerations. He ends with a discussion of computability constraints in games. The final chapter includes a critique by Herbert Simon of the author's methodology and the author's response.

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@Book{rubinstein97a,
  author =	 {Ariel Rubinstein},
  title =	 {Modeling Bounded Rationality},
  publisher =	 {{MIT} Press},
  year =	 1997,
  abstract =	 {The notion of bounded rationality was initiated in
                  the 1950s by Herbert Simon; only recently has it
                  influenced mainstream economics. In this book, Ariel
                  Rubinstein defines models of bounded rationality as
                  those in which elements of the process of choice are
                  explicitly embedded. The book focuses on the
                  challenges of modeling bounded rationality, rather
                  than on substantial economic implications. In the
                  first part of the book, the author considers the
                  modeling of choice. After discussing some
                  psychological findings, he proceeds to the modeling
                  of procedural rationality, knowledge, memory, the
                  choice of what to know, and group decisions. In the
                  second part, he discusses the fundamental
                  difficulties of modeling bounded rationality in
                  games. He begins with the modeling of a game with
                  procedural rational players and then surveys
                  repeated games with complexity considerations. He
                  ends with a discussion of computability constraints
                  in games. The final chapter includes a critique by
                  Herbert Simon of the author's methodology and the
                  author's response.},
  keywords = 	 {economics bounded-rationality},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/rubinstein97a.pdf},
  cluster = 	 {2495819185712178508}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:14:19 EST 2011