Vidal's libraryTitle: | Modeling Bounded Rationality |
Author: | Ariel Rubinstein |
Publisher: | MIT Press |
Year: | 1997 |
Abstract: | The notion of bounded rationality was initiated in the 1950s by Herbert Simon; only recently has it influenced mainstream economics. In this book, Ariel Rubinstein defines models of bounded rationality as those in which elements of the process of choice are explicitly embedded. The book focuses on the challenges of modeling bounded rationality, rather than on substantial economic implications. In the first part of the book, the author considers the modeling of choice. After discussing some psychological findings, he proceeds to the modeling of procedural rationality, knowledge, memory, the choice of what to know, and group decisions. In the second part, he discusses the fundamental difficulties of modeling bounded rationality in games. He begins with the modeling of a game with procedural rational players and then surveys repeated games with complexity considerations. He ends with a discussion of computability constraints in games. The final chapter includes a critique by Herbert Simon of the author's methodology and the author's response. |
Cited by 339 - Google Scholar
@Book{rubinstein97a,
author = {Ariel Rubinstein},
title = {Modeling Bounded Rationality},
publisher = {{MIT} Press},
year = 1997,
abstract = {The notion of bounded rationality was initiated in
the 1950s by Herbert Simon; only recently has it
influenced mainstream economics. In this book, Ariel
Rubinstein defines models of bounded rationality as
those in which elements of the process of choice are
explicitly embedded. The book focuses on the
challenges of modeling bounded rationality, rather
than on substantial economic implications. In the
first part of the book, the author considers the
modeling of choice. After discussing some
psychological findings, he proceeds to the modeling
of procedural rationality, knowledge, memory, the
choice of what to know, and group decisions. In the
second part, he discusses the fundamental
difficulties of modeling bounded rationality in
games. He begins with the modeling of a game with
procedural rational players and then surveys
repeated games with complexity considerations. He
ends with a discussion of computability constraints
in games. The final chapter includes a critique by
Herbert Simon of the author's methodology and the
author's response.},
keywords = {economics bounded-rationality},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/rubinstein97a.pdf},
cluster = {2495819185712178508}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:14:19 EST 2011