@Article{rothkopf98a,
  author =	 {Michael H. Rothkopf and Aleksandar Pekec and Ronald
                  M. Harstad},
  title =	 {Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions},
  googleid =	 {0Eu0dQCrX9IJ:scholar.google.com/},
  journal =	 {Management Science},
  volume =	 44,
  number =	 8,
  year =	 1998,
  issn =	 {0025-1909},
  pages =	 {1131--1147},
  publisher =	 {INFORMS},
  abstract =	 {There is interest in designing simultaneous auctions
                  for situations such as the recent FCC radio spectrum
                  auctions, in which the value of assets to a bidder
                  depends on which other assets he or she wins. In
                  such auctions, bidders may wish to submit bids for
                  combinations of assets. When this is allowed, the
                  problem of determining the revenue maximizing set of
                  nonconflicting bids can be difficult. We analyze
                  this problem, identifying several different
                  structures of permitted combinational bids for which
                  computational tractability is constructively
                  demonstrated and some structures for which
                  computational tractability cannot be guaranteed.},
  keywords =     {combinatorial auctions},
  url =		 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/rothkopf98a.pdf},
  cluster = 	 {15159022889215478736}
}