Vidal's libraryTitle: | Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics |
Author: | Matthew Rabin |
Journal: | The American Economic Review |
Volume: | 83 |
Number: | 5 |
Pages: | 1281--1302 |
Year: | 1993 |
Abstract: | People like to help those who are helping them, and to hurt those who are hurting them. Outcomes reflecting such motivations are called fairness equilibria. Outcomes are mutual-max when each person maximizes the other's material payoffs, and mutual-min when each person minimizes the other's payoffs. It is shown that every mutual-max or mutual-min Nash equilibrium is a fairness equilibrium. If payoffs are small, fairness equilibria are roughly the set of mutual-max and mutual-min outcomes; if payoffs are large, fairness equilibria are roughly the set of Nash equilibria. Several economic examples are consid- ered, and possible welfare implications of fairness are explored. |
Cited by 1537 - Google Scholar
@Article{rabin93a,
author = {Matthew Rabin},
title = {Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and
Economics},
journal = {The American Economic Review},
year = 1993,
volume = 83,
number = 5,
pages = {1281--1302},
abstract = {People like to help those who are helping them, and
to hurt those who are hurting them. Outcomes
reflecting such motivations are called fairness
equilibria. Outcomes are mutual-max when each
person maximizes the other's material payoffs, and
mutual-min when each person minimizes the other's
payoffs. It is shown that every mutual-max or
mutual-min Nash equilibrium is a fairness
equilibrium. If payoffs are small, fairness
equilibria are roughly the set of mutual-max and
mutual-min outcomes; if payoffs are large, fairness
equilibria are roughly the set of Nash
equilibria. Several economic examples are consid-
ered, and possible welfare implications of fairness
are explored.},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/rabin93a.pdf},
cluster = {1289972598436133877}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:13:49 EST 2011