Vidal's library
Title: | Economic dynamics of agents in multiple auctions |
Author: | Chris Preist, Andrew Byde, and Claudio Bartolini |
Book Tittle: | Proceedings of the fifth international conference on Autonomous agents |
Pages: | 545--551 |
Publisher: | ACM Press |
Year: | 2001 |
ISBN: | 158113326X |
DOI: | 10.1145/375735.376441 |
Abstract: | Over the last few years, electronic auctions have become an increasingly important aspect of e-commerce, both in the business to business and business to consumer domains. As a result of this, it is often possible to find many auctions selling similar goods on the web. However, when an individual is attempting to purchase such a good, they will usually bid in one, or a small number, of such auctions. This results in two forms of inefficiency. Firstly, the individual may pay more for the good than would be expected in an ideal market. Secondly, some sellers may fail to make a sale that could take place in an ideal market. In this paper, we present an agent that is able to participate in multiple auctions for a given good, placing bids appropriately to secure the cheapest price. We present experiments to show; (i) Current auction markets on the web are inefficient, with trades taking place away from equilibrium price, and not all benefit from trade being extracted. (ii) Our agent is able to exploit these inefficiencies, resulting in it making higher profits than the simple strategy of bidding in a small number of auctions. (iii) As more participants use our agent, the market becomes more efficient. When all participants use the agent, all trades take place close to equilibrium price, and the market approaches ideal behaviour. |
Cited by 69 - Google Scholar - ISBNdb - Amazon
@InProceedings{preist01b,
author = {Chris Preist and Andrew Byde and Claudio Bartolini},
title = {Economic dynamics of agents in multiple auctions},
googleid = {GKOZprdyEHsJ:scholar.google.com/},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the fifth international conference on
Autonomous agents},
year = 2001,
isbn = {158113326X},
pages = {545--551},
location = {Montreal, Quebec, Canada},
doi = {10.1145/375735.376441},
publisher = {ACM Press},
abstract = {Over the last few years, electronic auctions have
become an increasingly important aspect of
e-commerce, both in the business to business and
business to consumer domains. As a result of this,
it is often possible to find many auctions selling
similar goods on the web. However, when an
individual is attempting to purchase such a good,
they will usually bid in one, or a small number, of
such auctions. This results in two forms of
inefficiency. Firstly, the individual may pay more
for the good than would be expected in an ideal
market. Secondly, some sellers may fail to make a
sale that could take place in an ideal market. In
this paper, we present an agent that is able to
participate in multiple auctions for a given good,
placing bids appropriately to secure the cheapest
price. We present experiments to show; (i) Current
auction markets on the web are inefficient, with
trades taking place away from equilibrium price, and
not all benefit from trade being extracted. (ii) Our
agent is able to exploit these inefficiencies,
resulting in it making higher profits than the
simple strategy of bidding in a small number of
auctions. (iii) As more participants use our agent,
the market becomes more efficient. When all
participants use the agent, all trades take place
close to equilibrium price, and the market
approaches ideal behaviour.},
keywords = {auctions},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/preist01b.pdf},
cluster = {8867713799392174872},
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:15:15 EST 2011