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Title: Economic dynamics of agents in multiple auctions
Author: Chris Preist, Andrew Byde, and Claudio Bartolini
Book Tittle: Proceedings of the fifth international conference on Autonomous agents
Pages: 545--551
Publisher: ACM Press
Year: 2001
ISBN: 158113326X
DOI: 10.1145/375735.376441
Abstract: Over the last few years, electronic auctions have become an increasingly important aspect of e-commerce, both in the business to business and business to consumer domains. As a result of this, it is often possible to find many auctions selling similar goods on the web. However, when an individual is attempting to purchase such a good, they will usually bid in one, or a small number, of such auctions. This results in two forms of inefficiency. Firstly, the individual may pay more for the good than would be expected in an ideal market. Secondly, some sellers may fail to make a sale that could take place in an ideal market. In this paper, we present an agent that is able to participate in multiple auctions for a given good, placing bids appropriately to secure the cheapest price. We present experiments to show; (i) Current auction markets on the web are inefficient, with trades taking place away from equilibrium price, and not all benefit from trade being extracted. (ii) Our agent is able to exploit these inefficiencies, resulting in it making higher profits than the simple strategy of bidding in a small number of auctions. (iii) As more participants use our agent, the market becomes more efficient. When all participants use the agent, all trades take place close to equilibrium price, and the market approaches ideal behaviour.

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@InProceedings{preist01b,
  author =	 {Chris Preist and Andrew Byde and Claudio Bartolini},
  title =	 {Economic dynamics of agents in multiple auctions},
  googleid =	 {GKOZprdyEHsJ:scholar.google.com/},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the fifth international conference on
                  Autonomous agents},
  year =	 2001,
  isbn =	 {158113326X},
  pages =	 {545--551},
  location =	 {Montreal, Quebec, Canada},
  doi =		 {10.1145/375735.376441},
  publisher =	 {ACM Press},
  abstract =	 {Over the last few years, electronic auctions have
                  become an increasingly important aspect of
                  e-commerce, both in the business to business and
                  business to consumer domains. As a result of this,
                  it is often possible to find many auctions selling
                  similar goods on the web. However, when an
                  individual is attempting to purchase such a good,
                  they will usually bid in one, or a small number, of
                  such auctions. This results in two forms of
                  inefficiency. Firstly, the individual may pay more
                  for the good than would be expected in an ideal
                  market. Secondly, some sellers may fail to make a
                  sale that could take place in an ideal market. In
                  this paper, we present an agent that is able to
                  participate in multiple auctions for a given good,
                  placing bids appropriately to secure the cheapest
                  price. We present experiments to show; (i) Current
                  auction markets on the web are inefficient, with
                  trades taking place away from equilibrium price, and
                  not all benefit from trade being extracted. (ii) Our
                  agent is able to exploit these inefficiencies,
                  resulting in it making higher profits than the
                  simple strategy of bidding in a small number of
                  auctions. (iii) As more participants use our agent,
                  the market becomes more efficient. When all
                  participants use the agent, all trades take place
                  close to equilibrium price, and the market
                  approaches ideal behaviour.},
  keywords =     {auctions},
  url =		 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/preist01b.pdf},
  cluster = 	 {8867713799392174872},
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:15:15 EST 2011