@Article{porter08a,
  author =	 {Ryan Porter and Amir Ronen and Yoav Shoham and Moshe
                  Tennenholtz},
  title =	 {Fault tolerant mechanism design},
  journal =	 {Artificial Intelligence},
  year =	 2008,
  volume =	 172,
  number =	 15,
  pages =	 {1783--1799},
  abstract =	 {We introduce the notion of fault tolerant mechanism
                  design, which extends the standard game theoretic
                  framework of mechanism design to allow for
                  uncertainty about execution. Specifically, we define
                  the problem of task allocation in which the private
                  information of the agents is not only their costs of
                  attempting the tasks but also their probabilities of
                  failure. For several different instances of this
                  setting we present both, positive results in the
                  form of mechanisms that are incentive compatible,
                  individually rational, and efficient, and negative
                  results in the form of impossibility theorems.},
  doi = 	 {10.1016/j.artint.2008.06.004},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/porter08a.pdf},
  cluster = 	 {5734856554777557430}
}