@InProceedings{parkes04a,
  author =	 {David C. Parkes and Jeffrey Shneidman},
  title =	 {Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
                  Auctions},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the Third International Joint
                  Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent
                  Systems},
  pages =	 {261--268},
  year =	 2004,
  publisher =	 {{ACM}},
  abstract =	 {Mechanism design (MD) provides a useful method to
                  implement outcomes with desirable properties in
                  systems with self-interested computational
                  agents. One drawback, however, is that computation
                  is implicitly centralized in MD theory, with a
                  central planner taking all decisions.We consider
                  distributed implementations, in which the outcome is
                  determined by the self-interested agents
                  themselves. Clearly this introduces new
                  opportunities for manipulation.We propose a number
                  of principles to guide the distribution of
                  computation, focusing in particular on
                  Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms for implementing
                  outcomes that maximize total value across
                  agents. Our solutions bring the complete
                  implementation into an ex post Nash equilibrium.},
  keywords =     {multiagent mechanism-design},
  googleid = 	 {qmfuZmapRyUJ:scholar.google.com/},
  url =		 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/parkes04a.pdf},
  cluster = 	 {2686301960028448682}
}