Vidal's libraryTitle: | Bidding and Allocation in Combinatorial Auctions |
Author: | Noam Nisan |
Book Tittle: | Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce |
Pages: | 1--12 |
Year: | 2000 |
Abstract: | When an auction of multiple items is performed it is often desirable to allow bids on combinations of items as opposed to only on single items. Such an auction is often called combinatorial and the exponential number of possible combinations results in computational intractability of many aspects regarding such an auction. This paper considers two of these aspects: the bidding language and the allocation algorithm. First we consider which kinds of bids on combinations are allowed and how i.e., in what language they are specied. The basic tradeoff is the expressibility of the language versus its simplicity. We consider and formalize several bidding languages and compare their strengths. We prove exponential separations between the expressive power of different languages and show that one language OR bids with phantom items can polynomially simulate the others. We then consider the problem of determining the best allocation---a problem known to be computationally intractable. We suggest an approach based on Linear Programming LP and motivate it. We prove that the LP approach finds an optimal allocation if and only if prices can be attached to single items in the auction. We pinpoint several classes of auctions where this is the case and suggest greedy and branch and bound heuristics based on LP for other cases. |
Cited by 237 - Google Scholar
@InProceedings{nisan00a,
author = {Noam Nisan},
title = {Bidding and Allocation in Combinatorial Auctions},
googleid = {EFLYQOrZgaMJ:scholar.google.com/},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the {ACM} Conference on Electronic
Commerce},
pages = {1--12},
year = 2000,
abstract = {When an auction of multiple items is performed it is
often desirable to allow bids on combinations of
items as opposed to only on single items. Such an
auction is often called combinatorial and the
exponential number of possible combinations results
in computational intractability of many aspects
regarding such an auction. This paper considers two
of these aspects: the bidding language and the
allocation algorithm. First we consider which kinds
of bids on combinations are allowed and how i.e., in
what language they are specied. The basic tradeoff is
the expressibility of the language versus its
simplicity. We consider and formalize several bidding
languages and compare their strengths. We prove
exponential separations between the expressive power
of different languages and show that one language OR
bids with phantom items can polynomially simulate
the others. We then consider the problem of
determining the best allocation---a problem known to
be computationally intractable. We suggest an
approach based on Linear Programming LP and motivate
it. We prove that the LP approach finds an optimal
allocation if and only if prices can be attached to
single items in the auction. We pinpoint several
classes of auctions where this is the case and
suggest greedy and branch and bound heuristics based
on LP for other cases. },
keywords = {combinatorial auctions},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/nisan00a.pdf},
cluster = {11781937700311421456}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:14:57 EST 2011