Vidal's libraryTitle: | Multi-Agent Simulation of Collaborative Strategies in a Supply Chain |
Author: | Thierry Moyaux, Brahim Chaib-draa, and Sophie D'Amours |
Book Tittle: | Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems |
Pages: | 52--59 |
Publisher: | ACM |
Year: | 2004 |
Crossref: | aamas04 |
Abstract: | The bullwhip effect is the amplification of the order variability in a supply chain. This phenomenon causes important financial cost due to higher inventory levels and agility reduction. In this paper, we study, for each company in a supply chain, the individual incentive to collaborate to reduce this problem. To achieve this, we simulate a supply chain inspired by the Qu´ebec forest industry, in which each company is an agent that uses one of three ordering schemes. Each ordering scheme represents a level of collaboration. One run of the simulation is done with fifty (50) weeks for each of the 729 combinations of these 3 ordering schemes among the 6 companies of the simulation. In each run, we evaluate each company s inventory holding and backorder costs. These outcomes are used to build a game in the normal form, which is next analyzed using Game Theory. In particular, we find two Nash equilibria incurring the minimum cost of the supply chain. We also note that there are no Nash equilibria in which some companies do not collaborate: collaborating companies have no incentive to stop collaboration. |
Cited by 13 - Google Scholar
@InProceedings{moyaux04a,
author = {Thierry Moyaux and Brahim Chaib-draa and Sophie
D'Amours},
title = {Multi-Agent Simulation of Collaborative Strategies
in a Supply Chain},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Third International Joint
Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent
Systems},
pages = {52--59},
year = 2004,
publisher = {{ACM}},
crossref = {aamas04},
abstract = {The bullwhip effect is the amplification of the
order variability in a supply chain. This phenomenon
causes important financial cost due to higher
inventory levels and agility reduction. In this
paper, we study, for each company in a supply chain,
the individual incentive to collaborate to reduce
this problem. To achieve this, we simulate a supply
chain inspired by the Qu´ebec forest industry, in
which each company is an agent that uses one of
three ordering schemes. Each ordering scheme
represents a level of collaboration. One run of the
simulation is done with fifty (50) weeks for each of
the 729 combinations of these 3 ordering schemes
among the 6 companies of the simulation. In each
run, we evaluate each company s inventory holding
and backorder costs. These outcomes are used to
build a game in the normal form, which is next
analyzed using Game Theory. In particular, we find
two Nash equilibria incurring the minimum cost of
the supply chain. We also note that there are no
Nash equilibria in which some companies do not
collaborate: collaborating companies have no
incentive to stop collaboration.},
keywords = {multiagent modeling economics complexity},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/moyaux04a.pdf},
googleid = {PmHyMzrzxAgJ:scholar.google.com/},
cluster = {631897279043887422}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:12 EST 2011