Vidal's library
Title: Multi-Agent Simulation of Collaborative Strategies in a Supply Chain
Author: Thierry Moyaux, Brahim Chaib-draa, and Sophie D'Amours
Book Tittle: Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems
Pages: 52--59
Publisher: ACM
Year: 2004
Crossref: aamas04
Abstract: The bullwhip effect is the amplification of the order variability in a supply chain. This phenomenon causes important financial cost due to higher inventory levels and agility reduction. In this paper, we study, for each company in a supply chain, the individual incentive to collaborate to reduce this problem. To achieve this, we simulate a supply chain inspired by the Qu´ebec forest industry, in which each company is an agent that uses one of three ordering schemes. Each ordering scheme represents a level of collaboration. One run of the simulation is done with fifty (50) weeks for each of the 729 combinations of these 3 ordering schemes among the 6 companies of the simulation. In each run, we evaluate each company s inventory holding and backorder costs. These outcomes are used to build a game in the normal form, which is next analyzed using Game Theory. In particular, we find two Nash equilibria incurring the minimum cost of the supply chain. We also note that there are no Nash equilibria in which some companies do not collaborate: collaborating companies have no incentive to stop collaboration.

Cited by 13  -  Google Scholar

@InProceedings{moyaux04a,
  author =	 {Thierry Moyaux and Brahim Chaib-draa and Sophie
                  D'Amours},
  title =	 {Multi-Agent Simulation of Collaborative Strategies
                  in a Supply Chain},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the Third International Joint
                  Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent
                  Systems},
  pages =	 {52--59},
  year =	 2004,
  publisher =	 {{ACM}},
  crossref = 	 {aamas04},
  abstract =	 {The bullwhip effect is the amplification of the
                  order variability in a supply chain. This phenomenon
                  causes important financial cost due to higher
                  inventory levels and agility reduction. In this
                  paper, we study, for each company in a supply chain,
                  the individual incentive to collaborate to reduce
                  this problem. To achieve this, we simulate a supply
                  chain inspired by the Qu´ebec forest industry, in
                  which each company is an agent that uses one of
                  three ordering schemes. Each ordering scheme
                  represents a level of collaboration. One run of the
                  simulation is done with fifty (50) weeks for each of
                  the 729 combinations of these 3 ordering schemes
                  among the 6 companies of the simulation. In each
                  run, we evaluate each company s inventory holding
                  and backorder costs. These outcomes are used to
                  build a game in the normal form, which is next
                  analyzed using Game Theory. In particular, we find
                  two Nash equilibria incurring the minimum cost of
                  the supply chain. We also note that there are no
                  Nash equilibria in which some companies do not
                  collaborate: collaborating companies have no
                  incentive to stop collaboration.},
  keywords =     {multiagent modeling economics complexity},
  url =		 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/moyaux04a.pdf},
  googleid = 	 {PmHyMzrzxAgJ:scholar.google.com/},
  cluster = 	 {631897279043887422}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:12 EST 2011