Vidal's libraryTitle: | Bidding Algorithms for a Distributed Combinatorial Auction |
Author: | Benito Mendoza and José M. Vidal |
Book Tittle: | Proceedings of the Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems Conference |
Year: | 2007 |
Abstract: | Distributed allocation and multiagent coordination problems can be solved through combinatorial auctions. However, most of the existing winner determination algorithms for combinatorial auctions are centralized. The PAUSE auction is one of a few efforts to release the auctioneer from having to do all the work (it might even be possible to get rid of the auctioneer). It is an increasing price combinatorial auction that naturally distributes the problem of winner determination amongst the bidders in such a way that they have an incentive to perform the calculation. It can be used when we wish to distribute the computational load among the bidders or when the bidders do not wish to reveal their true valuations unless necessary. PAUSE establishes the rules the bidders must obey. However, it does not tell us how the bidders should calculate their bids. We have developed a couple of bidding algorithms for the bidders in a PAUSE auction. Our algorithms always return the set of bids that maximizes the bidder's utility. Since the problem is NP-Hard, run time remains exponential on the number of items, but it is remarkably better than an exhaustive search. In this paper we present our bidding algorithms, discuss their virtues and drawbacks, and compare the solutions obtained by them to the revenue-maximizing solution found by a centralized winner determination algorithm. |
Cited by 1 - Google Scholar
@InProceedings{mendoza07a,
author = {Benito Mendoza and Jos\'{e} M. Vidal},
title = {Bidding Algorithms for a Distributed Combinatorial
Auction},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent
Systems Conference},
year = 2007,
abstract = {Distributed allocation and multiagent coordination
problems can be solved through combinatorial
auctions. However, most of the existing winner
determination algorithms for combinatorial auctions
are centralized. The PAUSE auction is one of a few
efforts to release the auctioneer from having to do
all the work (it might even be possible to get rid
of the auctioneer). It is an increasing price
combinatorial auction that naturally distributes the
problem of winner determination amongst the bidders
in such a way that they have an incentive to perform
the calculation. It can be used when we wish to
distribute the computational load among the bidders
or when the bidders do not wish to reveal their true
valuations unless necessary. PAUSE establishes the
rules the bidders must obey. However, it does not
tell us how the bidders should calculate their
bids. We have developed a couple of bidding
algorithms for the bidders in a PAUSE auction. Our
algorithms always return the set of bids that
maximizes the bidder's utility. Since the problem is
NP-Hard, run time remains exponential on the number
of items, but it is remarkably better than an
exhaustive search. In this paper we present our
bidding algorithms, discuss their virtues and
drawbacks, and compare the solutions obtained by
them to the revenue-maximizing solution found by a
centralized winner determination algorithm.},
comment = {20\% acceptance rate.},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/papers/mendoza07a.pdf},
cluster = {14559246678977872068}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:46 EST 2011