@TechReport{mackie-mason94a,
  author =	 {Jerey K. MacKie-Mason and Hal R. Varian},
  title =	 {Generalized Vickrey Auctions},
  institution =	 {University of Michigan},
  year =	 1994,
  abstract =	 {We describe a generalization of the Vickrey
                  auction. Ourmechanism extends the auction to
                  implement efficient allocations for problems with
                  more than one good, multiple units for the goods,
                  and externalities. The primary restriction on
                  preferences is that they must be quasilinear.},
  keywords =     {economics auctions},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/mackie-mason94a.pdf},
  googleid = 	 {aDyVua-PPT8J:scholar.google.com/},
  cluster = 	 {4556956382864424040}
}