Vidal's library
Title: Bounded Rationality via Recursion
Author: Maciej Latek, Robert Axtell, and Bogumil Kaminski
Book Tittle: Proc. of the 8th Int. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Editor: Decker, Sichman nad Sierra, and Castelfranchi
Pages: 457--464
Year: 2009
Crossref: aamas09
Abstract: Current trends in model construction in the field of agentbased computational economics base behavior of agents on either game theoretic procedures (e.g. belief learning, fictitious play, Bayesian learning) or are inspired by artificial intelligence (e.g. reinforcement learning). Evidence from experiments with human subjects puts the first approach in doubt, whereas the second one imposes significant computational and memory requirements on agents. In this paper, we introduce an efficient computational implementation of n-th order rationality using recursive simulation. An agent is n-th order rational if it determines its best response assuming that other agents are (n−1)-th order rational and zero-order agents behave according to a specified, non-strategic, rule. In recursive simulations, the simulated decision makers use simulation to inform their own decision making (search for best responses). Our goal is to provide agent modelers with an off-the-shelf implementation of n-th order rationality that leads to modelconsistent behaviors of agents, without requiring a learning phase. We extend two classic games (Shapley’s fictitious play and Colonel Blotto) to illustrate aspects of the n-th order rationality concept as implemented in our framework.

Cited by 3  -  Google Scholar

@InProceedings{latek09a,
  author =	 {Maciej Latek and Robert Axtell and Bogumil Kaminski},
  title =	 {Bounded Rationality via Recursion},
  booktitle =	 {Proc. of the 8th Int. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and
                  Multi-Agent Systems},
  crossref =	 {aamas09},
  pages =	 {457--464},
  year =	 2009,              
  editor =	 {Decker and Sichman nad Sierra and Castelfranchi},
  abstract =	 {Current trends in model construction in the field of
                  agentbased computational economics base behavior of
                  agents on either game theoretic procedures
                  (e.g. belief learning, fictitious play, Bayesian
                  learning) or are inspired by artificial intelligence
                  (e.g. reinforcement learning). Evidence from
                  experiments with human subjects puts the first
                  approach in doubt, whereas the second one imposes
                  significant computational and memory requirements on
                  agents. In this paper, we introduce an efficient
                  computational implementation of n-th order
                  rationality using recursive simulation. An agent is
                  n-th order rational if it determines its best
                  response assuming that other agents are (n−1)-th
                  order rational and zero-order agents behave
                  according to a specified, non-strategic, rule. In
                  recursive simulations, the simulated decision makers
                  use simulation to inform their own decision making
                  (search for best responses). Our goal is to provide
                  agent modelers with an off-the-shelf implementation
                  of n-th order rationality that leads to
                  modelconsistent behaviors of agents, without
                  requiring a learning phase. We extend two classic
                  games (Shapley’s fictitious play and Colonel Blotto)
                  to illustrate aspects of the n-th order rationality
                  concept as implemented in our framework.},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/latek09a.pdf},
  cluster = 	 {185669515192180813}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:57 EST 2011