@InProceedings{kraus04a,
  author =	 {Sarit Kraus and Onn Shehory and Gilad Taase},
  title =	 {The Advantages of Compromising in Coalition
                  Formation with Incomplete Information},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the Third International Joint
                  Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent
                  Systems},
  pages =	 {588--595},
  year =	 2004,
  publisher =	 {{ACM}},
  abstract =	 {This paper presents protocols and strategies for
                  coalition formation with incomplete information
                  under time constraints. It focuses on strategies for
                  coalition members to distribute revenues amongst
                  themselves. Such strategies should preferably be
                  stable, lead to a fair distribution, and maximize
                  the social welfare of the agents. These properties
                  are only partially supported by existing coalition
                  formation mechanisms. In particular, stability and
                  the maximization of social welfare are supported
                  only in the case of complete information, and only
                  at a high computational complexity. Recent studies
                  on coalition formation with incomplete and uncertain
                  information address revenue distribution in a naïve
                  manner. In this study we specifically refer to
                  environments with limited computational resources
                  and incomplete information. We propose a variety of
                  strategies for revenue distribution, including the
                  strategy in which the agents attempt to distribute
                  the estimated net value of a coalition equally. A
                  variation of the equal distribution strategy in
                  which agents compromise and agree to a payoff lower
                  than their estimated equal share, was specifically
                  examined. Our experimental results show that, under
                  time constraints, the compromise strategy is stable
                  and increases the social welfare compared to
                  non-compromise strategies.},
  keywords =     {multiagent coalitions uncertainty},
  url =		 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/kraus04a.pdf},
  comment =	 {masrg},
  googleid = 	 {tKYQ-yI_IV0J:scholar.google.com/},
  cluster = 	 {6710714339232360116}
}