Vidal's libraryTitle: | Multi-Agent Influence Diagrams for Representing and Solving Games |
Author: | Daphne Koller and Brian Milch |
Journal: | Games and Economic Behavior |
Volume: | 45 |
Number: | 1 |
Pages: | 181--221 |
Year: | 2003 |
DOI: | 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00544-4 |
Abstract: | The traditional representations of games using the extensive form or the strategic form obscure much of the structure of real-world games. In this paper, we propose a graphical representation for noncooperative games---multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs). The basic elements in the MAID representation are variables, allowing an explicit representation of dependence, or relevance, relationships among variables. We define a decision variable D' as strategically relevant to D if, to optimize the decision rule at D, the decision maker needs to consider the decision rule at D'. We provide a sound and complete graphical criterion for determining strategic relevance. We then show how strategic relevance can be used to decompose large games into a set of interacting smaller games, which can be solved in sequence. We show that this decomposition can lead to substantial savings in the computational cost of finding Nash equilibria in these games. |
Cited by 66 - Google Scholar
@Article{koller03a,
author = {Daphne Koller and Brian Milch},
title = {Multi-Agent Influence Diagrams for Representing and
Solving Games},
journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
year = 2003,
volume = 45,
number = 1,
pages = {181--221},
abstract = {The traditional representations of games using the
extensive form or the strategic form obscure much of
the structure of real-world games. In this paper, we
propose a graphical representation for
noncooperative games---multi-agent influence
diagrams (MAIDs). The basic elements in the MAID
representation are variables, allowing an explicit
representation of dependence, or relevance,
relationships among variables. We define a decision
variable D' as strategically relevant to D if, to
optimize the decision rule at D, the decision maker
needs to consider the decision rule at D'. We
provide a sound and complete graphical criterion for
determining strategic relevance. We then show how
strategic relevance can be used to decompose large
games into a set of interacting smaller games, which
can be solved in sequence. We show that this
decomposition can lead to substantial savings in the
computational cost of finding Nash equilibria in
these games.},
keywords = {multiagent bayesian},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/koller03a.pdf},
doi = {10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00544-4},
cluster = {5926612126393763743},
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:02 EST 2011