Vidal's libraryTitle: | Adaptive Learning in Evolving Task Allocation Networks |
Author: | Tomas Klos and Bart Nooteboom |
Book Tittle: | Proc. of the 8th Int. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems |
Pages: | 465--472 |
Year: | 2009 |
Crossref: | aamas09 |
Abstract: | In this paper, we study multi-agent economic systems using a recent approach to economic modeling called Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE): the application of the Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) paradigm to economics. In this paper, we apply the CAS paradigm to the study of an industrial goods market, where firms need to decide between making and buying components. Computer simulations using our model explain different emerging distributions of economic activity among organizational forms (market and hierarchy) in terms of the search problem facing the agents, and in terms of the negative consequences of the agents’ search behavior on their perceived trustworthiness in the eyes of their potential partners. A further impediment to reaching optimal allocations we observe is that agents learn to protect themselves and their current allocation by being loyal and by focusing on their trust in their partner, rather than their partner’s profit generating potential. |
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@InProceedings{klos09a,
author = {Tomas Klos and Bart Nooteboom},
title = {Adaptive Learning in Evolving Task Allocation
Networks},
booktitle = {Proc. of the 8th Int. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and
Multi-Agent Systems},
crossref = {aamas09},
pages = {465--472},
year = 2009,
abstract = {In this paper, we study multi-agent economic systems
using a recent approach to economic modeling called
Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE): the
application of the Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS)
paradigm to economics. In this paper, we apply the
CAS paradigm to the study of an industrial goods
market, where firms need to decide between making
and buying components. Computer simulations using
our model explain different emerging distributions
of economic activity among organizational forms
(market and hierarchy) in terms of the search
problem facing the agents, and in terms of the
negative consequences of the agents’ search behavior
on their perceived trustworthiness in the eyes of
their potential partners. A further impediment to
reaching optimal allocations we observe is that
agents learn to protect themselves and their current
allocation by being loyal and by focusing on their
trust in their partner, rather than their partner’s
profit generating potential.},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/klos09a.pdf},
keywords = {task-allocation},
cluster = {9297274013094452253}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:57 EST 2011