@Article{kelly00a,
  author =	 {Frank Kelly and Richard Stenberg},
  title =	 {A Combinatorial Auction with Multiple Winners for
                  Universal Service},
  journal =	 {Management Science},
  year =	 2000,
  number = 	 4,
  volume =	 46,
  abstract =	 {We describe a discrete-time auction procedure called
                  PAUSE (Progressive Adaptive User Selection
                  Environment) for use in assigning COLR (Carrier of
                  Last Resort) responsibility for universal
                  service. The auction incorporates synergies by
                  permitting all combinatorial bids, is transparent to
                  the bidders, allows for multiple winners, and
                  minimizes the possibility of bidder collusion. The
                  procedure is computationally tractable for the
                  auctioneer and thus very efficient to run. The
                  inherent computational complexity of combinatorial
                  bidding cannot be eliminated. However, in this
                  auction the computational burden of evaluating
                  synergies rests with the bidders claiming those
                  synergies, while the auctioneer simply checks that a
                  bid is valid.},
  keywords =     {economics combinatorial auctions},
  pages =	 {586--596},
  googleid = 	 {QaGTWUVx9OoJ:scholar.google.com/},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/kelly00a.pdf},
  cluster = 	 {16930281441862066497}
}