Vidal's libraryTitle: | Efficient Agents for Cliff-Edge Environments with a Large Set of Decision Options |
Author: | Ron Katz and Sarit Kraus |
Book Tittle: | Proceedings of the Fifth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems |
Pages: | 697--705 |
Year: | 2006 |
Crossref: | aamas06 |
Abstract: | This paper proposes an efficient agent for competing in Cliff Edge (CE) environments, such as sealed-bid auctions, dynamic pricing and the ultimatum game. The agent competes in one-shot CE interactions repeatedly, each time against a different human opponent, and its performance is evaluated based on all the interactions in which it participates. The agent, which learns the general pattern of the population's behavior, does not apply any examples of previous interactions in the environment, neither of other competitors nor its own. We propose a generic approach which competes in different CE environments under the same configuration, with no knowledge about the specific rules of each environment. The underlying mechanism of the proposed agent is a new meta-algorithm, Deviated Virtual Learning (DVL), which extends existing methods to efficiently cope with environments comprising a large number of optional decisions at each decision point. Experiments comparing the performance of the proposed algorithm with algorithms taken from the literature, as well as another intuitive meta-algorithm, reveal a significant superiority of the former in average payoff and stability. In addition, the agent performed better than human competitors executing the same task. |
Cited by 1 - Google Scholar
@InProceedings{katz06a,
author = {Ron Katz and Sarit Kraus},
title = {Efficient Agents for Cliff-Edge Environments with a
Large Set of Decision Options},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Fifth International Joint
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems},
crossref = {aamas06},
pages = {697--705},
year = 2006,
abstract = {This paper proposes an efficient agent for competing
in Cliff Edge (CE) environments, such as sealed-bid
auctions, dynamic pricing and the ultimatum
game. The agent competes in one-shot CE interactions
repeatedly, each time against a different human
opponent, and its performance is evaluated based on
all the interactions in which it participates. The
agent, which learns the general pattern of the
population's behavior, does not apply any examples
of previous interactions in the environment, neither
of other competitors nor its own. We propose a
generic approach which competes in different CE
environments under the same configuration, with no
knowledge about the specific rules of each
environment. The underlying mechanism of the
proposed agent is a new meta-algorithm, Deviated
Virtual Learning (DVL), which extends existing
methods to efficiently cope with environments
comprising a large number of optional decisions at
each decision point. Experiments comparing the
performance of the proposed algorithm with
algorithms taken from the literature, as well as
another intuitive meta-algorithm, reveal a
significant superiority of the former in average
payoff and stability. In addition, the agent
performed better than human competitors executing
the same task.},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/katz06a.pdf},
cluster = {5299958810479469740}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:37 EST 2011