Vidal's library
Title: Efficient Agents for Cliff-Edge Environments with a Large Set of Decision Options
Author: Ron Katz and Sarit Kraus
Book Tittle: Proceedings of the Fifth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Pages: 697--705
Year: 2006
Crossref: aamas06
Abstract: This paper proposes an efficient agent for competing in Cliff Edge (CE) environments, such as sealed-bid auctions, dynamic pricing and the ultimatum game. The agent competes in one-shot CE interactions repeatedly, each time against a different human opponent, and its performance is evaluated based on all the interactions in which it participates. The agent, which learns the general pattern of the population's behavior, does not apply any examples of previous interactions in the environment, neither of other competitors nor its own. We propose a generic approach which competes in different CE environments under the same configuration, with no knowledge about the specific rules of each environment. The underlying mechanism of the proposed agent is a new meta-algorithm, Deviated Virtual Learning (DVL), which extends existing methods to efficiently cope with environments comprising a large number of optional decisions at each decision point. Experiments comparing the performance of the proposed algorithm with algorithms taken from the literature, as well as another intuitive meta-algorithm, reveal a significant superiority of the former in average payoff and stability. In addition, the agent performed better than human competitors executing the same task.

Cited by 1  -  Google Scholar

@InProceedings{katz06a,
  author =	 {Ron Katz and Sarit Kraus},
  title =	 {Efficient Agents for Cliff-Edge Environments with a
                  Large Set of Decision Options},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the Fifth International Joint
                  Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
                  Systems},
  crossref =	 {aamas06},
  pages =	 {697--705},
  year =	 2006,
  abstract =	 {This paper proposes an efficient agent for competing
                  in Cliff Edge (CE) environments, such as sealed-bid
                  auctions, dynamic pricing and the ultimatum
                  game. The agent competes in one-shot CE interactions
                  repeatedly, each time against a different human
                  opponent, and its performance is evaluated based on
                  all the interactions in which it participates. The
                  agent, which learns the general pattern of the
                  population's behavior, does not apply any examples
                  of previous interactions in the environment, neither
                  of other competitors nor its own. We propose a
                  generic approach which competes in different CE
                  environments under the same configuration, with no
                  knowledge about the specific rules of each
                  environment. The underlying mechanism of the
                  proposed agent is a new meta-algorithm, Deviated
                  Virtual Learning (DVL), which extends existing
                  methods to efficiently cope with environments
                  comprising a large number of optional decisions at
                  each decision point. Experiments comparing the
                  performance of the proposed algorithm with
                  algorithms taken from the literature, as well as
                  another intuitive meta-algorithm, reveal a
                  significant superiority of the former in average
                  payoff and stability. In addition, the agent
                  performed better than human competitors executing
                  the same task.},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/katz06a.pdf},
  cluster = 	 {5299958810479469740}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:37 EST 2011