Vidal's libraryTitle: | Dialogue games that agents play within a society |
Author: | Nishan C Karunatillake, Nicholas R. Jennings, Iyad Rahwan, and Peter McBurney |
Journal: | Artificial Intelligence |
Volume: | 173 |
Pages: | 935--981 |
Year: | 2009 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.artint.2009.02.002 |
Abstract: | Human societies have long used the capability of argumentation and dialogue to overcome and resolve conflicts that may arise within their communities. Today, there is an increasing level of interest in the application of such dialogue games within artificial agent societies. In particular, within the field of multi-agent systems, this theory of argumentation and dialogue games has become instrumental in designing rich interaction protocols and in providing agents with a means to manage and resolve conflicts. However, to date, much of the existing literature focuses on formulating theoretically sound and complete models for multi-agent systems. Nonetheless, in so doing, it has tended to overlook the computational implications of applying such models in agent societies, especially ones with complex social structures. Furthermore, the systemic impact of using argumentation in multiagent societies and its interplay with other forms of social influences (such as those that emanate from the roles and relationships of a society) within such contexts has also received comparatively little attention. To this end, this paper presents a significant step towards bridging these gaps for one of the most important dialogue game types; namely argumentation-based negotiation (ABN). The contributions are three fold. First, we present a both theoretically grounded and computationally tractable ABN framework that allows agents to argue, negotiate, and resolve conflicts relating to their social influences within a multi-agent society. In particular, the model encapsulates four fundamental elements: (i) a scheme that captures the stereotypical pattern of reasoning about rights and obligations in an agent society, (ii) a mechanism to use this scheme to systematically identify social arguments to use in such contexts, (iii) a language and a protocol to govern the agent interactions, and (iv) a set of decision functions to enable agents to participate in such dialogues. Second, we use this framework to devise a series of concrete algorithms that give agents a set of ABN strategies to argue and resolve conflicts in a multi-agent task allocation scenario. In so doing, we exemplify the versatility of our framework and its ability to facilitate complex argumentation dialogues within artificial agent societies. Finally, we carry out a series of experiments to identify how and when argumentation can be useful for agent societies. In particular, our results show: a clear inverse correlation between the benefit of arguing and the resources available within the context; that when agents operate with imperfect knowledge, an arguing approach allows them to perform more effectively than a non-arguing one; that arguing earlier in an ABN interaction presents a more efficient method than arguing later in the interaction; and that allowing agents to negotiate their social influences presents both an effective and an efficient method that enhances their performance within a society. |
Cited by 20 - Google Scholar
@Article{karunatillake09a,
author = {Nishan C Karunatillake and Nicholas R. Jennings and
Iyad Rahwan and Peter McBurney},
title = {Dialogue games that agents play within a society},
journal = {Artificial Intelligence},
year = 2009,
volume = 173,
pages = {935--981},
abstract = {Human societies have long used the capability of
argumentation and dialogue to overcome and resolve
conflicts that may arise within their
communities. Today, there is an increasing level of
interest in the application of such dialogue games
within artificial agent societies. In particular,
within the field of multi-agent systems, this theory
of argumentation and dialogue games has become
instrumental in designing rich interaction protocols
and in providing agents with a means to manage and
resolve conflicts. However, to date, much of the
existing literature focuses on formulating
theoretically sound and complete models for
multi-agent systems. Nonetheless, in so doing, it
has tended to overlook the computational
implications of applying such models in agent
societies, especially ones with complex social
structures. Furthermore, the systemic impact of
using argumentation in multiagent societies and its
interplay with other forms of social influences
(such as those that emanate from the roles and
relationships of a society) within such contexts has
also received comparatively little attention. To
this end, this paper presents a significant step
towards bridging these gaps for one of the most
important dialogue game types; namely
argumentation-based negotiation (ABN). The
contributions are three fold. First, we present a
both theoretically grounded and computationally
tractable ABN framework that allows agents to argue,
negotiate, and resolve conflicts relating to their
social influences within a multi-agent society. In
particular, the model encapsulates four fundamental
elements: (i) a scheme that captures the
stereotypical pattern of reasoning about rights and
obligations in an agent society, (ii) a mechanism to
use this scheme to systematically identify social
arguments to use in such contexts, (iii) a language
and a protocol to govern the agent interactions, and
(iv) a set of decision functions to enable agents to
participate in such dialogues. Second, we use this
framework to devise a series of concrete algorithms
that give agents a set of ABN strategies to argue
and resolve conflicts in a multi-agent task
allocation scenario. In so doing, we exemplify the
versatility of our framework and its ability to
facilitate complex argumentation dialogues within
artificial agent societies. Finally, we carry out a
series of experiments to identify how and when
argumentation can be useful for agent societies. In
particular, our results show: a clear inverse
correlation between the benefit of arguing and the
resources available within the context; that when
agents operate with imperfect knowledge, an arguing
approach allows them to perform more effectively
than a non-arguing one; that arguing earlier in an
ABN interaction presents a more efficient method
than arguing later in the interaction; and that
allowing agents to negotiate their social influences
presents both an effective and an efficient method
that enhances their performance within a society.},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/karunatillake09a.pdf},
cluster = {8180474761643939796},
doi = {10.1016/j.artint.2009.02.002}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:58 EST 2011