@Article{huang06a,
  author =	 {Jianwei Huang and Randall A. Berry and Michael
                  L. Honig},
  title =	 {Auction-Based Spectrum Sharing},
  journal =	 {Mobile Networks and Applications},
  year =	 2006,
  volume =	 11,
  pages =	 {405--418},
  abstract =	 {We study auction mechanisms for sharing spectrum
                  among a group of users, subject to a constraint on
                  the interference temperature at a measurement
                  point. The users access the channel using spread
                  spectrum signaling and so interfere with each
                  other. Each user receives a utility that is a
                  function of the received signal-to-interference plus
                  noise ratio. We propose two auction mechanisms for
                  allocating the received power. The first is an
                  auction in which users are charged for received
                  SINR, which, when combined with logarithmic
                  utilities, leads to a weighted max-min fair SINR
                  allocation. The second is an auction in which users
                  are charged for power, whichmaximizes the total
                  utility when the bandwidth is large enough and the
                  receivers are co-located. Both auction mechanisms
                  are shown to be socially optimal for a limiting 
                  ``large system'' with co-located receivers, where
                  bandwidth, power and the number of users are
                  increased in fixed proportion. We also formulate an
                  iterative and distributed bid updating algorithm,
                  and specify conditions under which this algorithm
                  converges globally to the Nash equilibrium of the
                  auction.},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/huang06a.pdf},
  doi = 	 {10.1007/s11036-006-5192-y},
  keywords = 	 {game-theory networks auctions},
  cluster = 	 {15126197676409315995}
}