Vidal's libraryTitle: | Vickrey Prices and Shortest Paths: What is an edge worth? |
Author: | John Hershberger and Subhash Surih |
Book Tittle: | Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science |
Pages: | 252--259 |
Year: | 2001 |
Abstract: | We solve a shortest path problem that is motivated by recent interest in pricing networks or other computational resources. Informally, how much is an edge in a network worth to a user who wants to send data between two nodes along a shortest path? If the network is a decentralized entity, such as the Internet, in which multiple self-interested agents own different parts of the network, then auctionbased pricing seems appropriate. A celebrated result from auction theory shows that the use of Vickrey pricing motivates the owners of the network resources to bid truthfully. In Vickrey's scheme, each agent is compensated in proportion to the marginal utility he brings to the auction. In the context of shortest path routing, an edge's utility is the value by which it lowers the length of the shortest path---the difference between the shortest path lengths with and without the edge. Our problem is to compute these marginal values for all the edges of the network efficiently. The naive method requires solving the single-source shortest path problem up to n times, for an n-node network. We show that the Vickrey prices for all the edges can be computed in the same asymptotic time complexity as one single-source shortest path problem. This solves an open problem posed by Nisan and Ronen. |
Cited by 67 - Google Scholar
@InProceedings{hershberger01a,
author = {John Hershberger and Subhash Surih},
title = {Vickrey Prices and Shortest Paths: What is an edge
worth?},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 42nd {IEEE} Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science},
pages = {252--259},
year = 2001,
abstract = {We solve a shortest path problem that is motivated
by recent interest in pricing networks or other
computational resources. Informally, how much is an
edge in a network worth to a user who wants to send
data between two nodes along a shortest path? If the
network is a decentralized entity, such as the
Internet, in which multiple self-interested agents
own different parts of the network, then
auctionbased pricing seems appropriate. A celebrated
result from auction theory shows that the use of
Vickrey pricing motivates the owners of the network
resources to bid truthfully. In Vickrey's scheme,
each agent is compensated in proportion to the
marginal utility he brings to the auction. In the
context of shortest path routing, an edge's utility
is the value by which it lowers the length of the
shortest path---the difference between the
shortest path lengths with and without the edge. Our
problem is to compute these marginal values for all
the edges of the network efficiently. The naive
method requires solving the single-source shortest
path problem up to n times, for an n-node
network. We show that the Vickrey prices for all the
edges can be computed in the same asymptotic time
complexity as one single-source shortest path
problem. This solves an open problem posed by Nisan
and Ronen.},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/hershberger01a.pdf},
cluster = {1533011697713937168},
keywords = {auctions negotiation}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:15:16 EST 2011