Vidal's library
Title: Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen's, Hicks', and Nash's Theories
Author: John C. Harsanyi
Journal: Econometrica
Volume: 24
Number: 2
Pages: 144--157
Month: April
Year: 1965
Abstract: It is proposed to show that Professor Zeuthen's solution of the bargaining problem (antedating the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory of games by more than a decade) is mathematically equivalent to Mr. Nash's solution (based on the theory of games), except that Zeuthen regards the two parties' mutual bargaining threats as given while Nash furnishes a solution also for the problem of selecting optimal threats. At the same time, it will be submitted that Zeuthen's approach in turn supplements Nash's more abstract treatment in an important way by supplying a plausible psychological model for the actual bargaining process. However, certain minor changes in the basic postulates of Zeuthen's theory and a simplification of Nash's method for finding the optimal threats will be suggested. Comparing Nash's theory with Professor Hick's theory of collective bargaining (publish shortly after Professor Zeuthen's), it will be arguie that the former rests on assumptions both more realistic and more consistend with the postulate of rational behaviour. Finally, the economic significance of the Zeuthen-Nash theory of bargaining will be discussed.

Cited by 5  -  Google Scholar

@Article{harsanyi65a,
  author =	 {John C. Harsanyi},
  title =	 {Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and
                  After the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of
                  Zeuthen's, Hicks', and Nash's Theories},
  journal =	 {Econometrica},
  year =	 1965,
  volume =	 24,
  number =	 2,
  pages =	 {144--157},
  month =	 {April},
  googleid = 	 {eBvWWUYZP20J:scholar.google.com/},
  abstract =	 {It is proposed to show that Professor Zeuthen's
                  solution of the bargaining problem (antedating the
                  von Neumann-Morgenstern theory of games by more than
                  a decade) is mathematically equivalent to Mr. Nash's
                  solution (based on the theory of games), except that
                  Zeuthen regards the two parties' mutual bargaining
                  threats as given while Nash furnishes a solution
                  also for the problem of selecting optimal
                  threats. At the same time, it will be submitted that
                  Zeuthen's approach in turn supplements Nash's more
                  abstract treatment in an important way by supplying
                  a plausible psychological model for the actual
                  bargaining process. However, certain minor changes
                  in the basic postulates of Zeuthen's theory and a
                  simplification of Nash's method for finding the
                  optimal threats will be suggested. Comparing Nash's
                  theory with Professor Hick's theory of collective
                  bargaining (publish shortly after Professor
                  Zeuthen's), it will be arguie that the former rests
                  on assumptions both more realistic and more
                  consistend with the postulate of rational
                  behaviour. Finally, the economic significance of the
                  Zeuthen-Nash theory of bargaining will be
                  discussed.},
  keywords =     {economics negotiation game-theory},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/harsanyi75a.pdf},
  cluster = 	 {7872038463612525432}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:13:26 EST 2011