@Article{groves73a,
  author =	 {Theodore Groves},
  title =	 {Incentives in Teams},
  journal =	 {Econometrica},
  year =	 1973,
  volume =	 41,
  number =	 4,
  pages =	 {617--631},
  month =	 {July},
  abstract =	 {This paper analyzes the problem of inducing the
                  members of an organization to behave as if they
                  formed a team. Considered is a conglomerate-type
                  organization consisting of a set of semi-autonomous
                  subunits that are coordinated by the organization's
                  head. The head's incentive problem is to choose a
                  set of employee compensation rules that will induce
                  his subunit managers to communicate accurate
                  information and take optimal decisions. The main
                  result exhibits a particular set of compensation
                  rules, an optimal incentive structure, that leads to
                  team behavior. Particular attention is directed to
                  the informational aspects of the problem. An
                  extended example of a resource allocation model is
                  discussed and the optimal incentive structure is
                  interpreted in terms of prices charged by the head
                  for resources allocated to the subunits.},
  keywords =     {economics mechanism-design},
  googleid = 	 {MBuLEv5BsgYJ:scholar.google.com/},
  cluster = 	 {482520669570669360},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/groves73a.pdf}
}