Vidal's library
Title: Characterization of satisfactory mechanisms for the revelation of preferences for public goods
Author: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
Journal: Econometrica
Volume: 45
Number: 2
Pages: 427--438
Year: 1977
Abstract: Social decision mechanisms that admit dominant strategies and result in Pareto optima are characterized by the class of mechanisms proposed by Groves. The concept of decision mechanisms is generalized and the characterization is shown to extend to these cases.

Cited by 210  -  Google Scholar

@Article{green77a,
  author =	 {Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont},
  title =	 {Characterization of satisfactory mechanisms for the
                  revelation of preferences for public goods},
  journal =	 {Econometrica},
  year =	 1977,
  volume =	 45,
  number =	 2,
  pages =	 {427--438},
  abstract =	 {Social decision mechanisms that admit dominant
                  strategies and result in Pareto optima are
                  characterized by the class of mechanisms proposed by
                  Groves. The concept of decision mechanisms is
                  generalized and the characterization is shown to
                  extend to these cases.},
  keywords =     {economics mechanism-design},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/green77a.pdf},
  googleid = 	 {QbY4VO9K_uAJ:scholar.google.com/},
  cluster = 	 {16212478100351006273}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:13:32 EST 2011