@InProceedings{friedman02a,
  author =	 {Eric Friedman and David Parkes},
  title =	 {Pricing {WiFi} at Starbucks---Issues in Online
                  Mechanism Design},
  googleid =	 {HtYtyR14dFIJ:scholar.google.com/},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the Fourth ACM Conf. on Electronic
                  Commerce},
  year =	 2002,
  abstract =	 {We consider the problem of designing mechanisms for
                  online problems in which agents arrive over time and
                  the mechanism is unaware of the agent until the
                  agent announces her arrival. Problems of this sort
                  are becoming extremely common particularly in a wide
                  variety of problems involving wireless
                  networking. We show how the standard results of
                  mechanism design can be modified to apply to this
                  setting, provide conditions under which e±cient and
                  incentive compatible mechanisms exist and analyze
                  several important online models including wireless
                  networks and web serving.},
  keywords =     {economics mechanism-design},
  url =		 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/friedman02a.pdf},
  cluster = 	 {5941505877733135902}
}