Vidal's libraryTitle: | Optimal Negotiation of Multiple Issues in Incomplete Information Settings |
Author: | Shaheen S. Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, and Nicholas Jennings |
Book Tittle: | Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems |
Pages: | 1080--1089 |
Publisher: | ACM |
Year: | 2004 |
Abstract: | This paper studies bilateral multi-issue negotiation between self-interested agents. The outcome of such encounters depends on two key factors: the agenda (i.e., the set of issues under negotiation) and the negotiation procedure (i.e., whether the issues are discussed together or separately). Against this background, this paper analyses such negotiations by varying the agenda and negotiation procedure. This analysis is carried out in an incomplete information setting in which an agent knows its own negotiation parameters, but has incomplete information about its opponent s. We first determine the equilibrium strategies for two negotiation procedures: issue-by-issue and package deal. On the basis of these strategies we determine the negotiation outcome for all possible agenda procedure combinations and the optimal agenda procedure combination for each agent. We determine those conditions for which agents have identical preferences over the optimal agenda and procedure and those for which they do not, and for both conditions we show the optimal agenda and procedure. |
Cited by 9 - Google Scholar
@InProceedings{fatima04b,
author = {Shaheen S. Fatima and Michael Wooldridge and
Nicholas Jennings},
title = {Optimal Negotiation of Multiple Issues in Incomplete
Information Settings},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Third International Joint
Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent
Systems},
pages = {1080--1089},
year = 2004,
publisher = {{ACM}},
abstract = {This paper studies bilateral multi-issue negotiation
between self-interested agents. The outcome of such
encounters depends on two key factors: the agenda
(i.e., the set of issues under negotiation) and the
negotiation procedure (i.e., whether the issues are
discussed together or separately). Against this
background, this paper analyses such negotiations by
varying the agenda and negotiation procedure. This
analysis is carried out in an incomplete information
setting in which an agent knows its own negotiation
parameters, but has incomplete information about its
opponent s. We first determine the equilibrium
strategies for two negotiation procedures:
issue-by-issue and package deal. On the basis of
these strategies we determine the negotiation
outcome for all possible agenda procedure
combinations and the optimal agenda procedure
combination for each agent. We determine those
conditions for which agents have identical
preferences over the optimal agenda and procedure
and those for which they do not, and for both
conditions we show the optimal agenda and
procedure.},
keywords = {multiagent negotiation},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/fatima04b.pdf},
googleid = {tv_7b5S3GtQJ:scholar.google.com/},
cluster = {15283730133597028278}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:15 EST 2011