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Title: Optimal Negotiation of Multiple Issues in Incomplete Information Settings
Author: Shaheen S. Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, and Nicholas Jennings
Book Tittle: Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems
Pages: 1080--1089
Publisher: ACM
Year: 2004
Abstract: This paper studies bilateral multi-issue negotiation between self-interested agents. The outcome of such encounters depends on two key factors: the agenda (i.e., the set of issues under negotiation) and the negotiation procedure (i.e., whether the issues are discussed together or separately). Against this background, this paper analyses such negotiations by varying the agenda and negotiation procedure. This analysis is carried out in an incomplete information setting in which an agent knows its own negotiation parameters, but has incomplete information about its opponent s. We first determine the equilibrium strategies for two negotiation procedures: issue-by-issue and package deal. On the basis of these strategies we determine the negotiation outcome for all possible agenda procedure combinations and the optimal agenda procedure combination for each agent. We determine those conditions for which agents have identical preferences over the optimal agenda and procedure and those for which they do not, and for both conditions we show the optimal agenda and procedure.

Cited by 9  -  Google Scholar

@InProceedings{fatima04b,
  author =	 {Shaheen S. Fatima and Michael Wooldridge and
                  Nicholas Jennings},
  title =	 {Optimal Negotiation of Multiple Issues in Incomplete
                  Information Settings},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the Third International Joint
                  Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent
                  Systems},
  pages =	 {1080--1089},
  year =	 2004,
  publisher =	 {{ACM}},
  abstract =	 {This paper studies bilateral multi-issue negotiation
                  between self-interested agents. The outcome of such
                  encounters depends on two key factors: the agenda
                  (i.e., the set of issues under negotiation) and the
                  negotiation procedure (i.e., whether the issues are
                  discussed together or separately). Against this
                  background, this paper analyses such negotiations by
                  varying the agenda and negotiation procedure. This
                  analysis is carried out in an incomplete information
                  setting in which an agent knows its own negotiation
                  parameters, but has incomplete information about its
                  opponent s. We first determine the equilibrium
                  strategies for two negotiation procedures:
                  issue-by-issue and package deal. On the basis of
                  these strategies we determine the negotiation
                  outcome for all possible agenda procedure
                  combinations and the optimal agenda procedure
                  combination for each agent. We determine those
                  conditions for which agents have identical
                  preferences over the optimal agenda and procedure
                  and those for which they do not, and for both
                  conditions we show the optimal agenda and
                  procedure.},
  keywords =     {multiagent negotiation},
  url =		 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/fatima04b.pdf},
  googleid = 	 {tv_7b5S3GtQJ:scholar.google.com/},
  cluster = 	 {15283730133597028278}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:15 EST 2011