Vidal's libraryTitle: | An agenda-based framework for multi-issue negotiation |
Author: | Shaheen S. Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, and Nicholas R. Jennings |
Journal: | Artificial Intelligence |
Volume: | 152 |
Number: | 1 |
Pages: | 1--45 |
Month: | jan |
Year: | 2004 |
DOI: | 10.1016/S0004-3702(03)00115-2 |
Abstract: | This paper presents a new model for multi-issue negotiation under time constraints in an incomplete information setting. The issues to be bargained over can be associated with a single good/service or multiple goods/services. In our agenda-based model, the order in which issues are bargained over and agreements are reached is determined endogenously, as part of the bargaining equilibrium. In this context we determine the conditions under which agents have similar preferences over the implementation scheme and the conditions under which they have conflicting preferences. Our analysis shows the existence of equilibrium even when both players have uncertain information about each other, and each agent' information is its private knowledge. We also study the properties of the equilibrium solution and determine conditions under which it is unique, symmetric, and Pareto ptimal. |
Cited by 112 - Google Scholar
@Article{fatima04a,
author = {Shaheen S. Fatima and Michael Wooldridge and
Nicholas R. Jennings},
title = {An agenda-based framework for multi-issue
negotiation},
googleid = {AhSeJ15Scv4J:scholar.google.com/},
journal = {Artificial Intelligence},
year = 2004,
volume = 152,
number = 1,
pages = {1--45},
month = jan,
abstract = {This paper presents a new model for multi-issue
negotiation under time constraints in an incomplete
information setting. The issues to be bargained over
can be associated with a single good/service or
multiple goods/services. In our agenda-based model,
the order in which issues are bargained over and
agreements are reached is determined endogenously,
as part of the bargaining equilibrium. In this
context we determine the conditions under which
agents have similar preferences over the
implementation scheme and the conditions under which
they have conflicting preferences. Our analysis
shows the existence of equilibrium even when both
players have uncertain information about each other,
and each agent' information is its private
knowledge. We also study the properties of the
equilibrium solution and determine conditions under
which it is unique, symmetric, and Pareto ptimal.},
keywords = {multiagent negotiation},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/fatima04a.pdf},
doi = {10.1016/S0004-3702(03)00115-2},
comment = {masrg},
cluster = {18334807597323785218}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:11 EST 2011