@Article{cohen90a,
  author =	 {Philip R. Cohen and Hector J. Levesque},
  title =	 {Intention is Choice with Commitment},
  journal =	 {Artificial Intelligence},
  year =	 1990,
  volume =	 42,
  number =	 {2--3},
  pages =	 {213--261},
  abstract =	 {This paper explores principles governing the
                  rational balance among an agent's beliefs, goals,
                  actions, and intentions. Such principles provide
                  specifications for artificial agents, and
                  approximate a theory of human action (as
                  philosophers use the term). By making explicit the
                  conditions under which an agent can drop his goals,
                  i.e., by specifying how the agent is committed to
                  his goals, the formalism captures a number of
                  important properties of intention. Specifically, the
                  formalism provides analyses for Bratman's three
                  characteristic functional roles played by intentions
                  [7, 9], and shows how agents can avoid intending all
                  the foreseen side-effects of what they actually
                  intend. Finally, the analysis shows how intentions
                  can be adopted relative to a background of relevant
                  beliefs and other intentions or goals. By
                  relativizing one agent's intentions in terms of
                  beliefs about another agent's intentions (or
                  beliefs), we derive a preliminary account of
                  interpersonal commitments.},
  keywords =     {multiagent bdi},
  doi = 	 {10.1016/0004-3702(90)90055-5},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/cohen90a.pdf},
  googleid = 	 {NFSiNdNqFOYJ:scholar.google.com/},
  comment = 	 {IFMAS influential paper award},
  cluster = 	 {16578993583628112948}
}