Vidal's libraryTitle: | Coordination in multiagent reinforcement learning: a Bayesian approach |
Author: | Georgios Chalkiadakis and Craig Boutilier |
Book Tittle: | Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems |
Pages: | 709--716 |
Publisher: | ACM Press |
Year: | 2003 |
DOI: | 10.1145/860575.860689 |
Abstract: | Much emphasis in multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) research is placed on ensuring that MARL algorithms (eventually) converge to desirable equilibria. As in standard reinforcement learning, convergence generally requires sufficient exploration of strategy space. However, exploration often comes at a price in the form of penalties or foregone opportunities. In multiagent settings, the problem is exacerbated by the need for agents to coordinate their policies on equilibria. We propose a Bayesian model for optimal exploration in MARL problems that allows these exploration costs to be weighed against their expected benefits using the notion of value of information. Unlike standard RL models, this model requires reasoning about how one s actions will influence the behavior of other agents. We develop tractable approximations to optimal Bayesian exploration, and report on experiments illustrating the benefits of this approach in identical interest games. |
Cited by 23 - Google Scholar
@inproceedings{chalkiadakis03a,
author = {Georgios Chalkiadakis and Craig Boutilier},
title = {Coordination in multiagent reinforcement learning: a
Bayesian approach},
googleid = {i-uAfi_bSrYJ:scholar.google.com/},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the second international joint
conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent
systems},
year = 2003,
pages = {709--716},
location = {Melbourne, Australia},
doi = {10.1145/860575.860689},
publisher = {ACM Press},
abstract = {Much emphasis in multiagent reinforcement learning
(MARL) research is placed on ensuring that MARL
algorithms (eventually) converge to desirable
equilibria. As in standard reinforcement learning,
convergence generally requires sufficient
exploration of strategy space. However, exploration
often comes at a price in the form of penalties or
foregone opportunities. In multiagent settings, the
problem is exacerbated by the need for agents to
coordinate their policies on equilibria. We propose
a Bayesian model for optimal exploration in MARL
problems that allows these exploration costs to be
weighed against their expected benefits using the
notion of value of information. Unlike standard RL
models, this model requires reasoning about how one
s actions will influence the behavior of other
agents. We develop tractable approximations to
optimal Bayesian exploration, and report on
experiments illustrating the benefits of this
approach in identical interest games.},
keywords = {multiagent reinforcement learning bayesian},
url =
{http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/chalkiadakis03a.pdf},
cluster = {13135552260211796875}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:15:43 EST 2011