@InProceedings{chakraborty08a,
  author =	 {Tanmoy Chakraborty and Michael Kearns},
  title =	 {Bargaining Solution in a Social Network},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the Workshop on Internet and Network
                  Economics},
  year =	 2008,
  abstract =	 {We study the concept of bargaining solutions, which
                  has been studied extensively in two-party settings,
                  in a generalized setting involving arbitrary
                  number of players and bilateral trade agreements
                  over a social network. We define bargaining
                  solutions in this setting, and show the existence of
                  such solutions on all networks under some natural
                  assumptions on the utility functions of the
                  players. We also investigate the influence of
                  network structure on equilibrium in our model, and
                  note that approximate solutions can be computed
                  efficiently when the networks are trees of bounded
                  degree and the parties have nice utility functions.},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/chakraborty08a.pdf}
}